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ABSTRACT
Conspiracy law has been the consistent subject of controversy, but most commentators do not
consider its negative effect on freedom of speech. When they do, their concerns focus only on the use
of speech as the crime’s actus reus. The use of speech as evidence to prove this actus reus is as
important and raises conceptually related issues, so current scholarship tells only half of the story.
This Article addresses the use of speech as the actus reus of conspiracy and evidence thereof. It sets
forth what I call the All-Purpose Speech Model. I argue that this Model accurately describes the use
of speech in conspiracy cases, and thereby reveals threats to free speech not recognized by past
approaches to the subject.
Current scholarship’s unipolar approach has led some commentators to conclude that conspiracy
law poses no threat to freedom of speech. Contrary to the necessary assumptions underlying this
conclusion, the All-Purpose Speech Model discounts the operational distinction among agreement,
overt act, mens rea, and evidence thereof. It reveals that these elements and evidence in support of
them collapse together, becoming homogenized. The result is that speech used as evidence becomes
the crime of conspiracy itself. This raises serious concerns for free speech.
This Article first provides a factual context by discussing conspiracy issues in terrorism,
communism, and narcotics cases. It then sets forth the All-Purpose Speech Model by exploring the
intersection between conspiracy law and free speech. Next, it uses Kent Greenawalt’s tripartite
structure of speech and the category of speech integral to criminal conduct to establish a new fourpart typology that illustrates the threat to free speech posed by conspiracy law. Finally, it applies
this typology to the extant system of speech protection, which includes the familiar concepts of highvalue speech, low-value speech, and speech thought to be entirely outside of the First Amendment’s
protection.
This Article addresses only conspiracy’s threat to principles of freedom of speech. A different, and
equally important, inquiry concerns its potential violation of the First Amendment. Recognizing
the novelty of its argument and the political, evidentiary, and conceptual challenges of placing
conspiracy charge-related speech under First Amendment protection, I reserve that inquiry for later
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work, so that it may be given the attention it deserves. Nonetheless, I conclude with a tentative
foray into Brandenburg-related constitutional questions posed by conspiracy law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its advent in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, criminal
1
conspiracy law has been, at least in hindsight, a subject of great controversy.
As American law began its earnest development of First Amendment
2
jurisprudence in the twentieth century, a number of scholars and jurists
3
began to recognize the confluence of these two areas of law. Given the
novelty of substantive speech rights, however, this confluence remains
4
underexplored. As a result, most critiques of conspiracy law have little to

1

2

3

4

See Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 409
(1959) (contending that defining the crime of conspiracy is far from settled); Francis B.
Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 393 (1922) (criticizing the doctrine of
criminal conspiracy as vague and uncertain); Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy,
72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 922–23 (1959) (highlighting the origin and early development of
criminal conspiracy law); Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872, 872
(1970) (explaining that cases involving the use of conspiracy law to prevent individuals
from joining controversial groups have attained notoriety). Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal,
Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1309 (2003) (contending that fifty years of critiques
aimed at certain features of conspiracy law have shifted the law in the wrong direction);
Benjamin F. Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328, 328 (1947) (tracing the
origin and development of criminal conspiracy).
See Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH
IN THE MODERN ERA 1, 1 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002) (pinpointing a
trilogy of cases in 1919 that first interpreted the principle of freedom of speech and
press).
See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (dismissing
concerns that violent acts are constitutionally protected and should not be evidence of an
overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy); Epton v. New York, 390 U.S. 29, 31 (1968)
(Douglas, J. dissenting) (considering whether a constitutionally protected right may be
used as evidence of an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy); Thomas I. Emerson,
Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1964) (writing that
freedom of association “is essential to the democratic way of life. At the same time the
exercise of this freedom has given rise to novel and troublesome problems.
Organizations have grown in size and power, and organizational techniques have
achieved a new order of effectiveness”); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 481
(2004) (“[T]he crime of conspiracy has routinely been used by prosecutors to ‘get’ union
organizers, political dissenters, radicals, and other ‘dangerous’ individuals who could not
otherwise be convicted of an offense.”); David B. Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1972) (acknowledging the infancy of
commentary dedicated to the conspiracy-speech combination). Indeed, a number of the
major twentieth century criminal speech cases were conspiracy cases. See Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 300 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 496 (1951);
Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 682 (1944); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
49 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919).
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 402 (1970) (“[T]he law of
inchoate crimes developed independently of the law of the First Amendment. The courts
have given little explicit consideration to reconciling one set of doctrines with the
other.”).
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6

do with free speech. When they do, the concern always involves the use of
7
speech only as the actus reus of agreement and, sometimes, the overt act.
8
This approach tells only one side of the story. In conspiracy cases, just
as in substantive crime cases, speech is used as evidence of the crime as well
as the crime itself. This dual use of speech comprises what I call the “All
Purpose Speech Model.” In the pages that follow, I argue that this Model
accurately describes the use of speech in conspiracy cases, and thereby
reveals threats to free speech not recognized by past approaches to the
subject.
9
Unlike past scholarship, the All-Purpose Speech Model considers
speech’s multiple uses together because they raise conceptually related
concerns. This is so because the functional distinction among agreement,
overt act, mens rea, and evidence of these elements is actually an illusion.
All of conspiracy’s elements and evidence thereof collapse together,
5

6

7

8

9

KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 81 (1989) [hereinafter
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE]; Note, Conspiracy and the First
Amendment, supra note 1, at 872 (“[C]ourts and commentators have paid surprisingly little
attention to the effect of conspiracy law itself on first amendment rights.”).
EMERSON, supra note 4, at 409 (“It can readily be seen that the law of conspiracy reaches
far back into inchoate conduct and has serious implications for the system of freedom of
expression.” (footnote omitted)).
All of the major First Amendment cases considering criminal statutes have taken this
view. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2010); Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (treating a cross burning as the actus reus of the crime);
Yates, 354 U.S. at 333; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 575 (Jackson, J., concurring); Hartzel, 322 U.S. at
683; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–49; Abrams, 250 U.S. at 618; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205. Speech
as crime has also been the lengthy subject of scholarship. See generally GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5.
See EMERSON, supra note 4, at 402 (“[T]he law of inchoate crimes developed
independently of the law of the First Amendment. The courts have given little explicit
consideration to reconciling one set of doctrines with the other.”).
Robert P. Faulkner, Evidence of First Amendment Activity at Trial: The Articulation of a Higher
Evidentiary Standard, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (considering the dangers to First
Amendment activity when a factfinder could punish a party for such activity); Aziz Z.
Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV.
833, 835 (2011) (proposing to evaluate the government’s use of religious expression as a
proxy for discovering terrorist threats); Peter E. Quint, Toward First Amendment Limitations
on the Introduction of Evidence: The Problem of United States v. Rosenberg, 86 YALE L.J. 1622,
1623 (1977) (discussing the role of the First Amendment on the admissibility of certain
evidence in trial); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Law Professor as Counterterrorist Tactician, 89
TEX. L. REV. 113, 113 (2011) (responding to Aziz Huq’s First Amendment concerns);
GEOFFREY R. STONE, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 153
(Vikram David Amar ed., 2009) (explaining the First Amendment dichotomy between
content-neutral and content-based restrictions); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the
Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1278 (2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Speech as
Conduct] (raising concerns about when speech should be stripped of First Amendment
protection, because it is, in fact, conduct).
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becoming homogenized. This means that speech as both crime and
10
evidence thereof are subject to problems of speech’s ambiguity and the fact
11
that courts favor the government in conspiracy cases.
The dual uses of speech must be considered together because of the
nature of conspiracy’s elements and their proof. Conspiratorial agreements
12
13
can be inferred, and overt acts, if they are required, can be proven by the
14
most minor and legal conduct or speech. Evidence of someone’s mens rea
and state of mind can amount to evidence of both an agreement and overt
15
act.
This allows and encourages proof of a conspiracy by verbosity of
speech evidence; prosecutors are rewarded with convictions by inundating

10

11

12

13

14

15

See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1185–86 (2005)
[hereinafter Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech] (“So most speakers of crime-facilitating
speech will know that the speech may facilitate crime, but relatively few will clearly intend
this. For many speakers, their true mental state will be hard to determine, because their
words may be equally consistent with intention to facilitate crime and with mere
knowledge. This means that any conclusion about the speaker’s purpose will usually just
be a guess.”).
See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
955 (1963) (“The natural balance of forces in society today tends to be weighted against
individual expression.”); see also Goldstein, supra note 1, at 412 (noting how the
ambiguous nature of a conspiracy makes it difficult for defendants to object to evidence
on relevance grounds); Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 875
(explaining that the broad contours of conspiracy law yield “chaotic procedures which
favor the prosecution’s case”); Note, The Objects of Criminal Conspiracy—Inadequacies of State
Law, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1056 (1955) (noting that conspiracy law allows prosecutors to
sidestep certain technical impediments to conviction).
American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946); United States v. Lopez,
979 F.2d 1024, 1029 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492, 497 (9th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Simon, 839 F.2d 1461, 1469 (11th Cir. 1988); SIR ROBERT
SAMUEL WRIGHT, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACIES AND AGREEMENTS 54 (1873)
(“[G]enerally speaking, there need not be any actual meeting or consultation, and that
the agreement is to be inferred from acts furnishing a presumption of a common
design.”).
Title 21 drug conspiracies, for example, require no overt act, United States v. Shabani, 513
U.S. 10, 11 (1994); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F.2d 307, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1987), nor do
some conspiracies to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, see 18
U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); United States v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 2007),
nor conspiracies to commit money laundering, Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 211
(2005).
See United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 911 (5th Cir. 1976) (traveling to another city is
an overt act); Bartoli v. United States, 192 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1951) (making a phone
call is an overt act); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474, 477 (1918) (finding
sufficient evidence of an overt act to allow the jury to rule); EMERSON, supra note 4, at 409
(explaining that in conspiracy law, the overt act “need not consist of action and tends to
be a mere fiction”).
See Shabani, 513 U.S. at 16; Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes,
11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 693, 695 (2011) (“A criminal agreement provides externalized evidence
that the parties intend for the crime to be committed.”).
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16

juries with mounds of “bad” sounding speech —“bad” speech being that
which sounds indicative of criminal activity, but may or may not actually be
17
so. The evidentiary distinction between agreement, overt act, mens rea,
and evidence of these elements fades; “bad” speech assumes the appearance
of relevance to proving all of these things, and amounts to a normatively
18
unacceptable blunderbuss approach to evidence that implicates free
19
speech concerns. Put another way, in conspiracy trials, speech is the sole
necessary building block, which works to prove conspiracy’s homogenized
set of ostensibly distinct elements.
By accurately describing the use of speech in conspiracy cases, the AllPurpose Speech Model reveals threats to free speech that have not been
recognized under the prior unipolar approach. Kent Greenawalt, for
example, has dismissed the concern, writing, “no one supposes that the
20
criminal law of conspiracy raises serious First Amendment problems.” This
makes sense if speech as the crime of conspiracy and speech as evidence
thereof are treated separately: on one hand, there is obvious value to
21
criminalizing certain conspiracies, and on the other, as Greenawalt writes,
“freedom to say what one feels and believes and hopes to do does not
22
constitute freedom from use of one’s statements as evidence.”

16
17

18

19

20
21
22

See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 878 (“[T]he volume of
evidence produced by a trial of several defendants may overwhelm the jury.”).
See Huq, supra note 9, at 837 (questioning reliability of religious speech as a proxy for
determining potential terror threats); Quint, supra note 9, at 1636 (questioning reliability
of pro-communism speech as an indication of a illegal act by the speaker).
This approach arises in part from “[t]he fact that it is almost impossible to supply a
correct definition of the crime” of conspiracy, because of the “unsettled” law on the
subject, Pollack, supra note 1, at 330, and that conspiracy law “is so vague that it almost
defies definition.” Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See also Note, The Objects of Criminal Conspiracy—Inadequacies of State Law,
supra note 11, at 1056 (“[T]he objects of conspiracy . . . are defined so vaguely and
broadly in the majority of states that both predictability of what will constitute an offense
and objectivity by the courts in applying the law have been greatly undermined.”
(footnote omitted)).
Although he was concerned with the problem of vicarious liability, not speech, Jens David
Ohlin has explored, as I do here, the same underlying problem that important
distinctions fundamental to criminal law principles have faded in the conspiracy law
context. See generally Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective
Reason, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147 (2007); see also United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d
165, 188 (1st Cir. 1969) (Coffin, J., dissenting) (“[T]he absence of clear definitions of the
elements of conspiracy creates a serious risk. . . . [Conspiracy] is . . . not well-defined and
experience teaches that even its traditional limitations tend to disappear.”).
Kent Greenawalt, “Clear and Present Danger” and Criminal Speech, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 96, 111.
See Katyal, supra note 1 (arguing that recent moves towards undermining conspiracy law
are a mistake).
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 245.
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This approach assumes a separation between speech-as-evidence and the
crime it is meant to prove. It employs what Thomas I. Emerson called the
23
“expression-action analysis” to the use of speech in criminal cases, which
arises when the government either seeks to make speech itself an inchoate
24
crime or when it seeks to use speech as evidence of a “crime of action.”
Although Emerson noted that this analysis becomes particularly problematic
25
in the context of conspiracy, he made clear that his expression-action
analysis was oriented toward the use of speech either as crime or as evidence
26
of a substantive crime. The expression-action analysis does not address the
problems associated with speech being used simultaneously as the crime
itself and evidence thereof. In other words, the homogenization of
conspiracy’s elements and evidence thereof eliminates the distinction
between expression-as-evidence and action-as-element. Expression becomes
27
the crime itself, and so conspiracy directly threatens free speech.
In this way, the All-Purpose Speech Model reveals conspiracy’s threats to
free speech and, possibly, the First Amendment. There is an important
28
difference between the two.
Greenawalt distinguishes between “the
23

24
25
26

27

28

Emerson’s expression-action analysis is distinct from his argument that “the essence of a
system of freedom of expression lies in the distinction between expression and action.”
Emerson, supra note 11. This is a nuance that has gone undetected. The expressionaction analysis is concerned with speech being used to prove a substantive criminal
action, and so falls outside of this Article’s central concern. Emerson’s discernment that
speech can be “expression” or “action” is a typology of speech and so is a different
inquiry. His two-part typology is, however, referenced in this article, as it closely tracks
what I call “operational” and “aspirational” speech, discussed in detail below.
EMERSON, supra note 4.
Id. See also Emerson, supra note 3, at 23–24.
See EMERSON, supra note 4, at 405, 406, 411–12 (identifying that First Amendment issues
arise “when the government seeks to use expression either as evidence that the
subsequent action took place or as evidence of the state of mind of the person who
engaged in the action. . . . Perhaps the best formulation that can be made . . . is that there
must be an unusually close connection between the expression and the action, that the
expression must be an integral part of the action, not remote or unattached. . . . [T]he
government might be required to establish the action part of the offense before it would
be allowed to prove any elements of expression. . . . Proof of a crime cannot be evidenced
by ‘protected expression’ that is so remote from action, or so subject to risk of penalty,
that freedom of expression is curtailed”).
See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 8 (2005) (“[W]hen
the government threatens speaker S with punishment if he attempts to give certain
information or express certain opinions to audience A, we are tempted to regard this as a
violation of S’s right to freedom of expression.”). This is merely a positive statement, and
says nothing about the reliability of speech to indicate an actual conspiracy, or, if a
criminal conspiracy actually exists, whether and to what extent speech should be
admissible to prove it. These issues are approached in this article, but are ultimately
separate inquiries deserving of their own attention.
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7 (1982) (“[T]he
analysis of freedom of speech can and should be separated from questions about the
limits of governmental authority in a broader sense.”).

872

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:3

political principle of freedom of speech” and “the constitutional protection”
29
of speech under the First Amendment. Legislatures, hopefully, look to
principles of free speech when crafting law, which may protect more speech
30
than the First Amendment requires.
Courts, in turn, provide a First
Amendment floor of protection that also may protect speech against
31
occasional legislative encroachments.
This Article argues that conspiracy law threatens free speech, i.e. speech
that is valuable in light of recognized rationales for protecting speech, but
may not be constitutionally protected. Recognizing the novelty of its
argument and the political, evidentiary, and conceptual challenges of
placing conspiracy charge-related speech under First Amendment
32
protection, I reserve that inquiry for later work, so that it may be given the
33
attention it deserves.
To make its argument, this Article sets forth a new typology of speech.
Current typologies do not respond as well as they might to the use of speech
in conspiracy cases. These typologies are Kent Greenawalt’s tripartite
structure of speech, which includes situation-altering utterances, weak
34
imperatives, and assertions of fact and value, and the category of speech
35
“integral” to criminal conduct. I combine these two systems to produce a
more useful four-part typology of speech, which includes what I call
36
operational and aspirational speech, and speech that is necessary,
facilitative, or related to the criminal conduct alleged. I call this the
Conspiracy Specific Speech Typology. It illustrates the relevant kinds of
speech used in conspiracy cases and reveals when speech is used in
normatively acceptable, uncontroversial ways, and when it is used in ways
that threaten free speech.
To these ends, this Article proceeds in four main parts. In Part II, I
provide a factual context. I discuss two post-9/11 terrorism-related

29
30
31
32
33

34
35
36

GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 42.
Id. at 166.
See id. (explaining that courts will rule unconstitutional statutes that have an
unconstitutional application that legislatures overlooked).
See Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH
IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 175, 186, 195.
This inquiry, indeed, would require substantial work. The interest in public safety is
central and legitimate, and a coherent theory of free speech in the conspiracy context is
lacking. Without that theory, any arguments in favor of free speech—or public safety, for
that matter—are likely to be arbitrary. See ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 23.
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 43, 57.
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (quoting Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)).
For a closely related concept, see EMERSON, supra note 4, at 18 (arguing that free speech
inquiries “must be directed toward ascertaining what is expression, and therefore to be
given the protection of expression, and what is action, and thus subject to regulation”).
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conspiracy cases, on one of which, United States v. Mehanna, I was a member
37
of the defense team. I also discuss speech related to jihad, communism,
and hip-hop music.
In Part III, I present the All-Purpose Speech Model by discussing the
intersection of speech and conspiracy.
In Part IV, I deconstruct
Greenawalt’s tripartite structure of speech and the category of speech
integral to criminal conduct, and present the Conspiracy Specific Speech
Typology.
In Part V, I briefly set forth the familiar three-level structure of speech
protection, which includes what most scholars call high-value speech, low38
value speech, and speech not believed to be governed by First Amendment
39
considerations. I bring all of the parts of this Article together and use this
structure to illustrate further how conspiracy law threatens free speech. In
the conclusion, I point to a possible future in which First Amendment
requirements bear heavily on conspiracy law. This future, I suggest, is based
on the Brandenburg line of cases and a reconceiving of the dangers associated
with criminal conspiracies.

37
38

39

United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO, 2011 WL 3652524 (D. Mass. Aug. 19,
2011).
See Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1608 (2010)
(arguing that trademarks often overlap between constitutionally “low-value” and “highvalue” speech designations); David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law
Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at
32, 37 (describing “low-value” categories of speech such as, inter alia, obscenity,
commercial speech, false and defamatory statements, “fighting words,” perjury,
blackmail); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1049–50
(2011) (observing that defenders of free speech often challenge abridgments of “lowvalue” or “fringe” speech as a bulwark against potential infringments of core, “high-value”
speech); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 122
(1993) (describing the “Madisonian ideal” which posits a two-tier First Amendment and
affords more protection to political speech than nonpolitical speech).
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that words “which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite” a breach of the peace, such as lewd
and obscene, libelous, or “fighting” words, do not garner First Amendment protection);
David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 32, 37; Richard A. Posner,
The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE
MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 120, 132.
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II. THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
A. Sami Omar Al-Hussayen
Sami Omar Al-Hussayen was a doctoral student in computer science at
40
the University of Idaho when, in 2004, he was charged with providing and
conspiring to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist
41
organization.
His indictment indicated that between 1994 and 2003, Al-Hussayen
provided “expert advice and assistance, communications equipment,
42
currency, monetary instruments, financial services and personnel.” He did
so “by, among other things, creating and maintaining internet websites and
other internet media designed to recruit mujahideen and raise funds for
43
violent jihad in Israel, Chechnya and other places.”
The indictment detailed that Al-Hussayen “helped create, operate and
maintain various websites and internet media associated with” certain
44
Islamic organizations that, said the government, had connections to
Hamas. These websites and Al-Hussayen’s assistance were used to support
45
and justify violent jihad.
For example, Al-Hussayen “published or
broadcasted a wide variety of speeches, lectures and articles justifying and
glorifying violent jihad, as well as graphic videos depicting mujahideen and
other subjects relating to violent jihad, with the intent to inspire viewers to
46
engage in and provide financial support for violent jihad.”
One of the websites with which Al-Hussayen was involved contained a
47
hyperlink to another website that solicited donations to Hamas. On that
same website and another, users were “invited to sign up for an internet email group, maintained and moderated by Al-Hussayen and others, in order
48
to obtain ‘news’ of violent jihad on Chechnya.” As an administrator, AlHussayen had the authority to accept, retain and delete messages posted to
49
the group.
Materials distributed on the site included the “Virtues of
50
51
Jihad” and instructions on how to train for jihad.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Maureen O’Hagan, A terrorism case that went awry, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, available
at seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2002097570_sami22m.html.
Second Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR 03-0048-C-EJL
(D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
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At trial, the government argued that Al-Hussayen had a “dual persona.
52
One face to the public and a private face of extreme jihad.” It defined
“violent jihad” as
the taking of action against persons or governments that are deemed to
be enemies of a fundamentalist version of Islam. Historically, violent
jihad has included armed conflicts and other violence in numerous areas
of the world, including Afghanistan, Chechnya, Israel, the Philippines
and Indonesia. The armed conflicts in these geographic areas and
elsewhere have involved murder, maiming, kidnaping, and destruction of
53
property.

The indictment and the government’s opening statement led one juror to
54
believe that Al-Hussayen was “going to be in jail for life.”
At trial, the government argued that Al-Hussayen’s “‘fingerprints were
intricately involved in the building of Web sites that called on young people
55
to go and kill themselves’ and to make donations for attacks.” It emerged,
however, there was no evidence that the websites actually recruited people,
56
or that Al-Hussayen believed their jihadi message.
Furthermore, the
defense argued that the hyperlinks from Al-Hussayen’s website to the
website that facilitated donations to Hamas were removed before Al57
Hussayen became involved.
Finally, the websites that Al-Hussayen
58
volunteered for were those of Muslim charities. The government alleged
that buried deep within them were a handful of violent messages—written
by people other than Al-Hussayen—that encouraged attacks on the United
59
States and donations to terrorist organizations.
By the end of the trial, the juror who thought Al-Hussayen would be
going away for life had changed his mind. In the course of the trial, he had
60
heard no evidence that Al-Hussayen supported terrorism.
The
61
government’s case, he said, “was a real stretch.” The entire jury agreed,
acquitting Al-Hussayen of all the terrorism charges after only a few hours of
62
deliberation.

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id. at 10.
O’Hagan, supra note 40.
Second Superseding Indictment at 5, United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR 03-0048-C-EJL
(D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2004).
O’Hagan, supra note 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Tarek Mehanna
Tarek Mehanna was found guilty in December 2011 of providing and
conspiring to provide material support to al Qaeda, and conspiracy to kill in
63
a foreign country. These charges were based on two factual allegations.
First, Mehanna was charged with conspiracy based on a 2004 trip he took to
Yemen, the purpose of which the government alleged was to find and train
at a terrorist training camp so that he could proceed to Iraq to fight against
64
United States forces. Second, Mehanna was charged with conspiracy to
provide and actually providing material support based on his translation of a
65
publicly available document called 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in
66
67
Jihad and a “jihadi video” called The Expedition of Umar Hadid, also publicly
68
There was no evidence that Mehanna performed these
available.
translations at al Qaeda’s behest, or that he had any contact at all with al
69
Qaeda.
The government argued that Mehanna’s translation work was itself
material support, because it encouraged others to fight jihad and otherwise
70
support al Qaeda.
This translation work, as well as instant messages
71
72
between Mehanna and others, jihadi videos, and images of 9/11 and

63
64
65

66
67
68
69

70
71

72

Jury Verdict Form, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Dec. 20,
2011).
Second Superseding Indictment at 5, 13, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017GAO (D. Mass. June 17, 2010).
See Full Text of “39 Ways to Serve and Participate”, INTERNET ARCHIVE,
http://www.archive.org/stream/39WaysToServeAndParticipate/39WaysToServeAndParti
cipateInJihad_djvu.txt (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
Second Superseding Indictment at 17, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO
(D. Mass. June 17, 2010).
Id. at 15–16.
The Expedition of Shaykh ‘Umar Hadid, LIVE LEAK, http://www.liveleak.com/
view?i=5e5_1182736217 (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
Rick Holmes, Tarek Mehanna, political prisoner, HOLMES & COMPANY: A BLOG FOR
INDEPENDENT MINDS (Dec. 20, 2011), http://blogs.wickedlocal.com/holmesandco/
2011/12/20/tarek-mehanna-political-prisoner/#axzz1jMHdJpOD; Adam Serwer, I Guess
Posting Videos Online Can Make You a Terrorist, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/12/i-guess-posting-videos-online-can-make-youterrorist; Daily Coverage of Tarek Mehanna’s Trial, 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad,
FREETAREK.COM, http://freetarek.wordpress.com/the-defendant/discussion-of-thegovernments-proffer/39-ways-to-serve-and-participate-in-jihad/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
Second Superseding Indictment at 6, 8, 17, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017GAO (D. Mass. June 17, 2010).
Julia Spitz, Mehanna trial closings raise a familiar question, METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Dec.
17, 2011, 1:26 AM), http://www.metrowestdailynews.com/features/x2140450734/SpitzMehanna-trial-closings-raise-a-familiar-question.
Patrick Tracey, Convicted for words, not deeds, SALON (Dec. 21, 2011, 8:55 AM),
http://www.salon.com/topic/tarek_mehanna/.
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73

Osama bin Laden, were all “bad” speech that was introduced to show
74
Mehanna’s state of mind as well as infer the alleged conspiracy’s agreement
and overt act.

C. Beyond Terror
The results of these cases were indictments or convictions for activity that
may or may not have been actual criminal conspiracies, may or may not have
ripened into actual conduct, an expansion of conspiratorial combinations
beyond what traditional conspiracy law recognizes, and a fear-driven milieu
75
that sees terrorism as “different” and thus favors the government. These
phenomena are not new to the 9/11 era, nor are they restricted to terrorrelated cases. The First Amendment conspiracy cases emerging in the wake
of World War I can be seen as the results of anti-socialist preventive
76
77
policing, just as the post-World War II cases are now recognized as part of
78
an anti-communist witch hunt.
The doctrine of variance, designed to
address these prosecutorial missteps, was established in Kotteakos v. United
79
States, a fraud conspiracy case.
Consider also the recent First Circuit opinion in United States v.
80
Dellosantos.
In that case, the government charged the defendant with
81
conspiracy to distribute narcotics.
The conspiracy allegedly included a
82
total of eighteen people.
The defendant was convicted after a trial of
83
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana.
73

74

75

76
77
78

79
80
81
82
83

Laurel J. Sweet, Jury convicts Sudbury man of terror plot, BOSTON HERALD (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://bostonherald.com/news/regional/view/2011_1220jury_reaches_verdict_in_tarek
_mehanna_terror_trial.
See Milton J. Valencia, Tarek Mehanna guilty of terror charges, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 20,
2011), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/12/20/tarek-mehanna-found-guiltyall-terror-charges/chpbwimRMbvdNMOladJ08J/story.html?camp=pm.
See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 872 (“Throughout various
periods of xenophobia, chauvinism, and collective paranoia in American history,
conspiracy law has been one of the primary governmental tools employed to deter
individuals from joining controversial political causes and groups.” (footnote omitted)).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 300 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
497 (1951).
Mark Brodin, What One Lawyer Can Do for Society: Lessons from the Remarkable Career of
William P. Homans Jr., 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 43 (2011); Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and
the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 95 (2009); Dara L. Schottenfeld,
Comment, Witches and Communists and Internet Sex Offenders, Oh My: Why It Is Time to Call
Off the Hunt, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359, 365 (2008).
328 U.S. 750, 752 (1946).
649 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 111.
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On appeal, the First Circuit determined that two conspiracies operated,
one that included distribution of cocaine, and another that included
84
distribution of cocaine and marijuana. The Court found that Dellosantos
85
was a member of the cocaine-only conspiracy, and so vacated his conviction
86
for distributing both drugs.
In proving that Dellosantos conspired to distribute both marijuana and
cocaine, the government,
under the guise of its single conspiracy theory . . . subjected the
Defendants to voluminous testimony relating to unconnected crimes in
which they took no part. This situation created a pervasive risk of
“evidentiary spillover,” where the jury might have unfairly transferred to
the Defendants the guilt relating to the other sixteen individuals.
Specifically, there was a pervasive risk that such transference of guilt
might have led the jury to find the Defendants guilty of joining the
conspiracy . . . despite the fact that the evidence was insufficient to
87
support such a finding.

In light of this, the Court concluded that “there should be little question
that the jury’s decision to find the Defendants guilty of joining the
conspiracy . . . was influenced by the plethora of evidence implicating the
88
other sixteen indicted co-defendants.”

D. Communism, Hip-Hop, and Jihad
The All-Purpose Speech Model is a problem because of the “bad” and
inaccurate meaning given to the speech used. The government can seek to
impose such meanings at trial or, where the defendant is charged with a
conspiracy related to his association with a suspect group, a priori
89
assumptions of “badness” may be applied to his speech.
Justice Black, writing in Yates v. United States, leveled this criticism of the
dubiously relevant use of speech in conspiracy trials:

84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 125.
Id.
See Herbert Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the
American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 627
(1961) (“The problem is in preventing legitimate agitation of an extreme or
inflammatory nature from being misinterpreted as solicitation to crime. It would not be
difficult to convince a jury that inflammatory rhetoric in behalf of an unpopular cause is
in reality an invitation to violate the law rather than an effort to seek its change through
legitimate criticism. Minority criticism has to be extreme in order to be politically
audible, and if it employs the typical device of lauding a martyr, who is likely to have been
a lawbreaker, the eulogy runs the risk of being characterized as a request for
emulation.”).
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The kind of trials conducted here are wholly dissimilar to normal
criminal trials. Ordinarily these “Smith Act” trials are prolonged affairs
lasting for months. In part this is attributable to the routine introduction
in evidence of massive collections of books, tracts, pamphlets,
newspapers, and manifestoes discussing Communism, Socialism,
Capitalism, Feudalism and governmental institutions in general, which, it
is not too much to say, are turgid, diffuse, abstruse, and just plain dull.
Of course, no juror can or is expected to plow his way through this jungle
of verbiage. The testimony of witnesses is comparatively insignificant.
Guilt or innocence may turn on what Marx or Engels or someone else
wrote or advocated as much as a hundred or more years ago. Elaborate,
refined distinctions are drawn between “Communism,” “Marxism,”
“Leninism,” “Trotskyism,” and “Stalinism.” When the propriety of
obnoxious or unorthodox views about government is in reality made the
crucial issue, as it must be in cases of this kind, prejudice makes
90
conviction inevitable except in the rarest circumstances.

Communist-related speech in the 1950s carried “bad” speech
connotations that may or may not have portended the danger their stigma
91
suggested. Hip-hop lyrics have similarly been used against defendants in
drug conspiracy trials. In one case, a twenty-minute video of the defendant
rapping with another man about his involvement in the drug trade was used
92
to prove his involvement in a narcotics conspiracy, even though no drugs
93
were actually seized. The defendant testified that rapping was his art and
that his lyrics were not true, but were meant to draw a response from the
94
crowd.
The Eighth Circuit found that admission of the video did not
95
violate the defendant’s rights.
In another case, the government introduced a rap video it had found on
96
YouTube during the course of a defendant’s drug conspiracy trial. The
Eleventh Circuit found error in admission of this video, in part because the
defendant was not in it, had not authored the lyrics, and had not adopted
97
the views expressed.

90
91

92
93
94
95
96
97

354 U.S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See Huq, supra note 9, at 891–92 (observing that courts in the 1950s and 60s, concerned
with anti-Communist overreach, crafted criminal conspiracy doctrine such that
associational conduct could only be criminally punishable where the defendant had
“specific intent” to commit the crime ascribed to the associated organization, thus
preventing juries from “using unpopular associational ties as a proxy for dangerousness”).
United States v. Moore, 639 F.3d 443, 445, 448 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id. at 448.
United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 488 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 493.
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The government’s definition of jihad in the Al-Hussayen case and other
98
cases also illustrates this a priori assumption of “badness.” In fact, jihad can
mean a number of things. It can mean a body of legal doctrine pertaining
99
to legitimate warfare; “disputation and efforts made for the sake of God
100
and in his cause”; “‘internal,’ ‘spiritual’ jihad [that is] every bit as old as its
101
102
‘external,’ ‘fighting’ counterpart”; and preaching the word of Islam.
For charges that include a substantive act, the All-Purpose Speech Model
is less concerning, both because actual conduct vouches for speech’s
relevance and because the government has less need to use words like jihad
103
in simplified, exaggerated, and unsupported ways.
This is why most
104
observers are not troubled
by the Second Circuit’s rejection of the
105
defendant’s First Amendment claim in United States v. Rahman.
Rahman
was the Muslim cleric found guilty of seditious conspiracy for plotting to
bomb the World Trade Center in 1993 and assassinate Egyptian President
106
Hosni Mubarak. Although Rahman engaged only in speech, it was closely
tied to actual conduct, not least of which was the actual bombing of the
107
World Trade Center.
Because there was actual conduct, the government
had no need to advance a dubiously reliable definition of jihad. Rahman’s
own use of jihad, in fact, clearly confirmed his criminality. He exhorted his

98

99
100
101
102
103

104

105
106
107

Criminal Indictment (Third Superseding) at 1–2, United States v. Sadequee, No. 1:06-CR147-WSD-GGB (N.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2008) (“‘Violent jihad,’ as used in this Indictment, refers
to planning, facilitating, preparing for, and engaging in acts of physical violence,
including murder, kidnaping, maiming, assault, and damage to and destruction of
property, against civilian and government targets, in purported defense of Muslims or
retaliation for acts committed against Muslims, in the United States and in foreign
nations.”); Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Hassoun, No. 04-60001-CRCOOKE (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2005) (“As used in this Superseding Indictment, the terms
‘violent jihad’ or ‘jihad’ include planning, preparing for, and engaging in, acts of physical
violence, including murder, maiming, kidnapping, and hostage-taking. The term
‘mujahideen’ means warriors engaged in violent jihad.”).
MICHAEL BONNER, JIHAD IN ISLAMIC HISTORY: DOCTRINES AND PRACTICE 3 (2006); MALISE
RUTHVEN, ISLAM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (1997).
BONNER, supra note 99, at 21.
Id. at 22.
DAVID COOK, UNDERSTANDING JIHAD 122 (2005).
For examples of indictments invoking the word jihad negatively, see Superseding
Indictment, United States v. Siraj, No. 05-104 (S-1) (NG) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2006), and
Indictment, United States v. Mustafa, No. S2 04 Cr. 356 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y Feb. 6, 2006).
See, e.g., Joseph Grinstein, Jihad and the Constitution: The First Amendment Implications of
Combating Religiously Motivated Terrorism, 105 YALE L.J. 1347, 1365 (1996); Marc Rohr,
Grand Illusion? The Brandenberg Test and Speech that Encourages or Facilitates Criminal Acts,
38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 26 (2002); John F. Wirenius, Brigaded With Action: Undirected
Advocacy and the First Amendment, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 299, 311 (2002).
189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 123–24.
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followers to “‘do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades,
108
with the missile . . . against God’s enemies.’”
Contrast Rahman’s definition of jihad with that set forth by one Islamic
scholar: “the believer may undertake jihad ‘by his heart; his tongue; his
109
hands; and by the sword’—the foremost of these being the first.” Another
scholar notes that some Islamic traditions indicate that the best type of jihad
110
is speaking the truth to an iniquitous ruler or tyrant. The Quran, in turn,
states that a Muslim should “[c]ombat the polytheists with your possessions,
111
your selves, and your tongues.”
The point is that talk of jihad, like communist tracts and hip-hop, is often
112
a priori assumed to be probative of criminal intent or activity.
This is
separate from but related to the All-Purpose Speech Model. It is related
because the dual uses of speech inherent in the Model raise serious
113
questions of process outcome reliability. When speech is used as evidence
and as crime (with the same speech often used for both), confidence in a
114
guilty verdict may be undermined.
The a priori assumption is also
separate from the All-Purpose Speech Model because the Model would exist
whether language were saddled with an a priori “bad” assumption, or it was
given a “bad” meaning by the prosecutor at trial. The practical result is
qualitatively the same; “bad” speech is admitted that is not as probative as it
appears. A priori assumptions simply make the speech much more damning
and difficult to counter.
108
109
110
111
112

113

114

Id. at 104.
RUTHVEN, supra note 99, at 118.
COOK, supra note 102, at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
Fawaz A. Gerges has argued, for example, that:
[I]t is misleading and counterproductive to lump all jihadis under the rubric of Al
Qaeda and its affiliates, because they account for only a tiny minority within the
jihadi movement . . . [A] huge block within the jihadi movement . . . vehemently
rejected Al Qaeda’s strategy and methods and broke with their transnationalist
counterparts for good.
FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY: WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL 27 (2005).
Similarly, Michael Bonner has argued that “we encounter the temptation of allowing the
notion of jihad to apply to almost everything—a temptation that is best for us to avoid.”
BONNER, supra note 99, at 11.
Note, The Objects of Criminal Conspiracy—Inadequacies of State Law, supra note 11, at 1059
(claiming that “[s]erious problems of vagueness and lack of predictability arise . . . when
the objects of conspiracy are defined” generally).
It should be noted that outcome reliability problems in the context of the All-Purpose
Speech Model compound the problems observed in conspiracy from more traditional
vantage points. In 1873, Robert Samuel Wright observed:
The [apparently conspiratorial] concert may commonly be a mere simultaneity
arising from the fact that one real or supposed grievance happens to press at the
same time on many persons; and in such a case an interchange of complaints is
inevitable, and does not of itself involve anything which it can be desirable to
punish.
WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 35–36.
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In pursuing inchoate offenses, less actual conduct means that the
government must increasingly rely on speech to be simultaneously the
agreement, overt act, evidence of these elements, and evidence of mens
115
This encourages prosecutors to stretch the meaning of language.
rea.
116
Jihad has come to mean terrorism, and not only in the government’s eyes.
Groups like al Qaeda also have practically redefined the word to mean abject
117
and raw terrorism.
These varied meanings, and the government’s interest in avoiding
another 9/11, lead to disturbing linguistic shapeshifting. If a defendant has
been critical of the U.S. Government, he is not speaking truth to a tyrant but
is evincing criminal intent. If someone claims that he wants to spread the
word of Islam, this does not mean that he wants to engage in proselytizing,
but that he wants to engage in fighting. If someone argues that Chechen
rebels are freedom fighters and that Russian soldiers in that region are war
criminals, it means that he believes that the 9/11 hijackers were freedom
118
fighters and the people killed in those attacks got what they deserved.
If
someone argues that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are justified
to defend these countries, then that person must intend to kill U.S. service
people if given the chance. When someone uses the word jihad, that person
must support terrorism and must himself be a criminal. If he has not taken
any action, his crime is conspiracy.
The challenge, then, is to embed language into its milieu by deeply
understanding it. In a Seventh Circuit drug case, for example, in which a
rap lyric was introduced, the defendant argued that this music “‘constitutes a
popular musical style that describes urban life’ . . . [and] the reality around
119
its author.”
The Seventh Circuit responded that the defendant’s
120
“knowledge of this reality . . . was relevant” to the charged crimes.
121
In that case, drugs were found in the defendant’s luggage, and so
there was little prejudice to introducing the rap lyrics. In light of the AllPurpose Speech Model, however, this case suggests that the government will
115

116
117
118

119
120
121

See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 188 n.9 (1st Cir. 1969) (Coffin, J., dissenting in
part) (“Counsel for the defendants were faced . . . with theories that the Call was the
agreement and ipso facto proof of the conspiracy . . . .”).
GERGES, supra note 112, at 3.
Sebastian Gorka, Understanding the jihadis—by way of Sun Tzu, NATIONAL POST, July 17,
2009, at A15.
See GILLES KEPEL, JIHAD: THE TRAIL OF POLITICAL ISLAM 2–3 (2002) (describing
preparations for the invasion of Afghanistan, stating “American troops were
prepositioned in the former Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, an unprecedented event for
which the quid pro quo would be giving the Kremlin a free hand in dealing with the
Chechen uprising”).
United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id. at 449.
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give defendants’ speech “bad” meanings, even when the government, judge,
122
or jury do not understand the speech or the meaning of the speech is
stretched.
People who live in crime-ridden neighborhoods—or in
communities that are perceived to be crime-ridden—have a greater
incentive to censor themselves than people in safe or apparently safe
123
neighborhoods. Put another way, innocent talk of things like jihad,
124
communism, and drug dealing can be misconstrued and result in threats
to free speech.

E. World-Wide Communism and the Global Jihad Movement
Conspiracy law has always struggled to define its borders, and so has
125
given rise to doctrines including the Pinkerton rule on vicarious liability,
126
127
multiplicity,
admission of co-conspirators’ statements,
and rules to
128
exclude those statements. The basic question is who is in a conspiracy and
129
who is not. The answer has always lain in whether someone agreed to join.
130
The conceptual difficulties with proving agreements notwithstanding,
some conspiracy charges stretch the notion of agreement beyond what
traditional conspiracy law recognizes. During the anti-communist era, for
example, Congress found that:

122

123

124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Jason E. Powell, R.A.P.: Rule Against Perps (Who Write Rhymes), 41 RUTGERS L.J. 479, 525
(2009) (“The law has demonstrated its resentment toward rap music for many years in a
variety of ways. This is one more method to continue that trend. Presenting violent,
misogynistic rap lyrics written by a defendant to a judge and jury who do not understand
where they are coming from, and in all likelihood simply have a distaste for rap, is not
fair.”).
Monica K. Miller et al., From Kobe Bryant to Saddam Hussein: A Descriptive Examination and
Psychological Analysis of How Religion Likely Affected Twenty-Five Recent High-Profile Trials, 9
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 18 (2007) (describing jurors as associating jihad with terrorism or
violence); see generally Shaheen Sardar Ali & Javaid Rehman, The Concept of Jihad in Islamic
International Law, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 321 (2005) (arguing that Islam has
become one of the most misunderstood religions and is often associated with intolerance,
violence, and aggression).
One scholar has offered a litany of rap lyrics pointing to their wrongful use as evidence.
See Powell, supra note 122.
Pinkterton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646–47 (1946).
Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1942).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Petrozziello,
548 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1977).
United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524, 528 (1921); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197,
203 (1893); Yates v. United States, 225 F.2d 146, 155 (9th Cir. 1955).
The fact that agreements can be inferred, for example, is the subject of criticism.
Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Several Problems in Criminal Conspiracy Laws and Some Proposals for
Reform, 43 CRIM. LAW BULL. 427 (2007) (addressing “certain problems that are inherent
in the law of conspiracy and that occur with great frequency”).
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The Communist movement in the United States is an organization
numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly
disciplined. . . . [I]t seeks converts far and wide by an extensive system of
schooling and indoctrination. . . . [Congress must pass] legislation
recognizing the existence of such world-wide conspiracy and designed to
131
prevent it from accomplishing its purpose in the United States.
132

The twenty-first century’s “global jihad movement” follows the notion
of a world-wide communist conspiracy in form and function. It refers to an
alleged international conspiracy to organize and execute Islam-related
133
terror attacks.
Whenever someone is accused of such terror activity, the
government claims he is part of that conspiracy. This argument, and its
conceptual difficulty, is illustrated in the testimony of a government expert
in United States v. Kassir:
[A]l Qaeda is not just an organization. Al Qaeda also views itself as an
ideology. It hopes to encourage people around the world who are
unable to travel to places like Afghanistan or Somalia or wherever else, it
hopes to encourage those people to do what they can at home.
Particularly after 9/11, there was a tremendous emphasis on the training
camps are closed [sic]. You can’t just come to Afghanistan now to get
training and go home. Now the battle is in your own backyard. The
battle is what you yourself are able to do with your own abilities, so you
should do whatever you can. It is an individual duty upon you to
participate in the struggle. It is not about Usama Bin Laden and it’s not
about al Qaeda. It is about the methodology and the ideology behind
them. If you follow the same methodology and the same ideology, then
134
you too can be al Qaeda.

Ironically, the United States’ success against al Qaeda may contribute to
this conceptually problematic approach. As the United States and its allies
135
have been successful in targeting and disrupting al Qaeda, the terrorist

131

132

133

134
135

Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1961)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 131–32
(1959) (“The record discloses considerable testimony concerning the foreign domination
and revolutionary purposes and efforts of the Communist Party.”).
Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention Debate, 50 S.
TEX. L. REV. 669, 677 (2009) [hereinafter Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the
Preventive Detention Debate].
Although it is true that the global jihad movement is, in fact, a loosely connected
international conglomeration of individuals and groups, see MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS
JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008), I contend that it is not a
combination that traditional conspiracy law recognizes.
United States v. Kassir, No. 04 Cr. 356 (JFK), 2009 WL 2913651, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11,
2009).
U.S. believes it can now destroy al Qaeda, REUTERS (May 3, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-binladen-usa-brennanidUSTRE7422WK20110503.
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that
organization has been defeated as a structured organization
137
traditional conspiracy law recognizes. It has become an idea, and al
138
Qaeda-inspired jihad has retained currency.
The United States is now
139
fighting a dangerous idea. This idea, much like that of communism, is the
link between domestic conspiracy defendants and their supposed ideological
140
leaders abroad.
A defendant’s alleged inclusion in the global jihad movement permits a
broad swath of speech to be introduced in evidence. Someone’s comment
that 9/11 was justified, or that bin Laden is a role model, becomes an
agreement to join the international conspiracy. Communication of this
comment to another amounts to recruitment and thus an overt act. Finally,
support for 9/11 and bin Laden provides evidence of the mens rea to
141
provide material support to terrorism.

136

137
138

139

140

141

See Elisabeth Bumiller, New Pentagon Chief Says Qaeda Defeat in Reach, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
2011, at A11 (reporting Defense Secretary Panetta’s comments about the near-defeat of
Al Qaeda and the narrowing of the U.S. campaign against the organization).
See Mark Mazzetti, Al Qaeda Affiliates Growing Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2011, at A8.
Jack Healy, Blasts Rock Baghdad as Political Crisis in Iraq Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/23/world/middleeast/explosions-rock-baghdadamid-iraqi-political-crisis.html?_r=0.
See NAT’L SECURITY PREPAREDNESS GRP., BIPARTISAN POL’Y CENTER, TENTH ANNIVERSARY
REPORT CARD: THE STATUS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 7, 20 (Sept.
2011),
available
at
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
CommissionRecommendations.pdf (warning of the continuing threats of
“diversification,” recruitment, and self-radicalization of violent Islamist extremism).
See Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Portions of Counts One
through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Mehanna, No. 0910017-GAO, 2011 WL 3511226 (D. Mass 2011) (“Whether the [terrorist organization]
ever knew that the defendants agreed to support them through [advocacy by speech] is
irrelevant in a conspiracy analysis; what matters is the intent and understanding of the
conspirators.”); United States v. Kassir, No. 04 CR. 356 (JFK), 2009 WL 2913651, at *1, *9
n.7, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009) (assuming that defendant’s “sharing al Qaeda’s ideology”
merely coincidentally was sanctioned by al Qaeda, the material support statute “can
criminalize the distribution of certain written materials,” which includes “jihad
propaganda”); United States v. Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669, 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(charging defendants with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism by
distributing “how to” videos and obtaining videos from the internet even though “[t]he
government [did] not allege that any organized terrorist or insurgent organization
solicited the defendants to commit the crimes charged to them”).
Although beyond the scope of this Article, the global jihad movement allows statements of
far-flung people to be admitted in evidence as co-conspirator statements. See FED. R.
EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (permitting at trial testimony regarding the statements of a coconspirator). Bin Laden’s fatwa to kill all Americans and Jews could therefore be
admissible against “homegrown terrorists.” Al Qaeda’s Second Fatwa, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb.
23, 1998), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html. See
United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Farhane,
634 F.3d 127, 132 n.4 (2d Cir. 2011).
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F. Law Enforcement Responses
Conspiracy law is a natural response to perceived national crises because,
as Justice Jackson wrote, “[c]onspiratorial movements do indeed lie back of
the political assassination, the coup d’etat, the putsch, the revolution, and
142
seizures of power in modern times . . . .”
Three specific law enforcement
responses to such perceived crises increase conspiracy’s threat to free
speech.
143
First, the judicial system provides for “exceptions” in the context of
144
145
146
147
terrorism, socialism, communism, and drugs, which create matrices
of new legal rules that shift the adversarial balance in criminal cases in favor
148
of the government and away from defendants. These exceptions are often
viewed as necessary in light of the country’s Wars on Terrorism,

142
143

144

145
146
147

148

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
These exceptions are referred to as “the exemption of certain categories of crime from
normal legal rules and a fervent hostility to any arguments challenging the underlying
rationale for special treatment . . . .” Luna, supra note 78, at 102.
Laurie R. Blank, The Consequences of a “War” Paradigm for Counterterrorism: What Impact on
Basic Rights and Values?, 46 GA. L. REV. 719 (2012) (arguing that the War on Terror
upends delicate legal balances and thus threatens individual rights).
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 686–87 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Haneefah
A. Jackson, Note, When Love is a Crime: Why the Drug Prosecutions and Punishments of Female
Non-Conspirators Cannot Be Justified By Retributive Principles, 46 HOW. L.J. 517, 527 (2003)
(“While American criminal law is firmly based on the theory that a defendant must
demonstrate the requisite mens rea (the intent to commit a crime) and actus reus (the
actual criminal conduct), conspiracy law provides an exception to the act requirement of
criminal prosecutions. Critics of conspiracy laws argue that it violates the very foundation
of our criminal justice system because it is predominately mental and rises to the level of
punishing an individual for thoughts rather than acts.” (footnotes omitted)); Steven
Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J.
889 (1987).
David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of
Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 268–69 (1996); Luna, supra note 78, at
137. One way for the drug and terrorism exceptions to operate is to not require proof of
an overt act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11
(1994); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Abdi,
498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
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149

Communism, and Drugs, in which the danger is apparently so serious that
150
the government must be given great leeway in the criminal justice process.
Second, the government applies a “prevention paradigm” of law
151
enforcement, which means that inchoate offenses will be charged at ever
152
153
earlier stages,
increasing the risk of prosecutorial error.
Because
conspiracy is often proved in large part by speech, earlier law enforcement
intervention also increases the risk that protected speech will be used to
154
prove nonexistent conspiracies. This is, in part, why Aziz Huq has argued
that the use of religious speech in terrorism trials is problematic because it is
155
a poor signal for criminal intent in general, and unjustifiably targets the
156
Muslim community specifically.
This is a problem because it chills
individuals’ speech and hinders Muslim communities’ ability to worship and
157
discuss their religion. For example, prior to the use of religious speech as
a signal of terrorism, a Muslim may have referred to himself as Salafi, which
is a fundamentalist strain of Islam that is not necessarily connected to
terrorism. The government has, however, connected Salafism to terrorism,
158
so the Muslim might no longer call himself Salafi. Religious speech, Huq
149

150

151

152

153
154

155
156
157

158

Raj Dhanasekaran, When Rotten Apples Return: How the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 Can Deter
Domestic Law Enforcement Authorities From Using Military Interrogation Techniques on Civilians,
5 CONN. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 233, 233–38 (2005); Linda McKay-Panos, Post 9/11 Legislation
and Policy in Canada—Neo-McCarthyism?, 54 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 178, 180 (2005).
Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists and Permanent Emergency, 25
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 397 (2003); Karl T. Muth, Sarbanes-Oxley Writ Large: SarbanesOxley and the Foreign Commerce Clause, 8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 29, 41 (2009).
Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–30 (2005); Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Att’y Gen.,
Remarks at the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh on Stopping Terrorists Before They
Strike: The Justice Department’s Power of Prevention (Aug. 16, 2006), available at
http://
www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060816.html
(calling
the
prevention of terrorism “a meaningful and daily triumph”).
EMERSON, supra note 4, at 402–03 (“[T]he issues [involving the interaction between
inchoate crimes and the First Amendment] are gradually beginning to emerge as the
increasingly complex controls of modern society range further into inchoate conduct in
the effort to punish or prevent ultimate action.” (footnote omitted)).
See Jeremy M. Miller, RICO and the Bill of Rights: An Essay on a Crumbling Utopian Ideal, 104
COM. L.J. 336, 345 n.40 (1999).
EMERSON, supra note 4, at 402 (“Inchoate conduct frequently takes the form of
expression. . . . Consequently social regulations that reach back into inchoate conduct
may raise serious First Amendment problems.”).
Huq, supra note 9.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 852; Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on The
Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 375,
376 (2007).
Huq, supra note 9, at 855; see also EMERSON, supra note 4, at 411 (“In practice, conspiracy
law can be even more harmful to uninhibited expression. A jury, which may be hostile to
an unpopular cause, decides who is in the conspiracy, what the intent of the parties was,
whether the agreement contemplated some action that occurred later, and similar crucial
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argues, is inaccurately used as a proxy for criminal intent, probably underlies
159
a number of plea bargains, and leads to pretextual charges such as those
160
for false statements and immigration violations.
Third, the government applies an “unaffiliated model” of conspiratorial
liability, linking unconnected people in ways which traditional conspiracy
161
law does not recognize.
In the post-9/11 era, these law enforcement responses have resulted in
prosecutors employing “an aggressive approach to traditional conspiracy
liability, thereby establishing a capacity to prosecute potential
terrorists . . . even in the absence of any specificity as to particular violent
162
acts they might commit.”
The government does so by linking defendants
163
to the “global jihad movement,” even though the defendants may be
164
unconnected to any designated foreign terrorist organization.
These law enforcement responses carry with them the public safety
165
virtues that traditional conspiracy law and scholars like Robert Chesney,
166
167
Neal Kumar Katyal,
and Lawrence Rosenthal
express. The vice,

159

160
161

162
163
164

165
166

matters. It thus becomes dangerous for any individual to participate in a campaign or
demonstration that in the course of its unfolding may give rise to some violation of law. It
is hard to conceive of a more chilling effect upon the system of free expression.”).
Huq, supra note 9, at 845 (“[M]any terrorism investigations (perhaps a majority) end in
‘pretextual’ charges, from wire fraud to immigration crimes. . . . In those cases, the state’s
upstream reliance on religious speech for singling out a suspect is never revealed.”
(footnote omitted)).
Id. at 847.
Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 439 (2007) [hereinafter Chesney, Beyond
Conspiracy?].
Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention Debate, supra note 132,
at 676–77.
Id. at 677.
See United States v. Kassir, No. 04 CR. 356(JFK), 2009 WL 2913651, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
11, 2009) (describing the testimony of the government’s expert that, despite having no
actual connection to al Qaeda, “[i]f you follow the same methodology and the same
ideology, then you too can be al Qaeda”); Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding
Indictment at 20, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D. Mass. July 29, 2011)
(“Whether the [foreign terrorist organization] ever knew that the defendants agreed to
support them through [speaking] is irrelevant in a conspiracy analysis.”); United States v.
Amawi, 552 F. Supp. 2d 669, 671 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (charging defendants with conspiracy
to provide material support to terrorism by distributing “how to” videos and obtaining
videos from the internet even though “[t]he government [did] not allege that any
organized terrorist or insurgent organization solicited the defendants to commit the
crimes charged to them”).
See Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention Debate, supra note
132, at 684 (discussing conspiracy law’s “capacity for prevention”).
See Katyal, supra note 1, at 1397 (arguing that applying insights from corporate law
scholars and organizational theorists to conspiracy law can stymie criminal conspiracies).
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however, is that it worsens the problems associated with the All-Purpose
Speech Model by leading to the prosecution of people who may not have
actually conspired to commit a crime or who were not serious about it.
Some defendants may have plans that are, according to former FBI Deputy
168
Others may
Director John Pistole, “more aspirational than operational.”
not be criminals, but law-abiding dissenters. For those people, the
prevention paradigm results in a risk of “prosecuting dissenting thought
169
uncoupled from culpable action.”
It “might strike the wrong balance
between the benefits of preventive action and the risks that defendants will
170
be prosecuted for acts that they might never actually have committed.”
The All-Purpose Speech Model lies at the heart of this “wrong balance.”

III. THE INTERSECTION OF SPEECH AND CONSPIRACY
By now it is clear that speech intersects with conspiracy in intimate and
important ways. Questions remain: When is this intersection not a
problem? Why do problems arise? What is the structure of the problem?
And what is the danger flowing from this problem?

A. When the All-Purpose Speech Model Presents No Problem
The All-Purpose Speech Model observes that speech can be both a crime
and evidence thereof. If nothing else is said, this observation does not
amount to much. We are normatively satisfied with many categories of
171
speech being crimes (and thus unprotected), just as we are with relevant
speech being admissible as evidence of crimes (thus, in my controversial

167
168

169
170
171

See Rosenthal, supra note 9, at 117 (arguing that “statements of ideological belief may
provide valuable evidence of motive or intent in criminal prosecutions”).
Chesney, supra note 132, at 685 (quoting Transcript, Attorney General Gonzales Holds a News
Conference
on
Terrorist
Arrests,
WASH.
POST
(June
23,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/23/AR200606230094
2.html.).
Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?, supra note 161, at 426 (describing the position of civil
liberties advocates).
Id. at 435 (citing Dahlia Lithwick, Stop Me Before I Think Again, WASH. POST, July 16, 2006,
at B3).
These include, for example, true threats, incitement, false statements, and fraud.

890

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
172

[Vol. 15:3

173

opinion, unprotected ). In run-of-the-mill cases, speech and crime
174
intersect in two justifiable ways.
First, consider a defendant who is charged with conspiracy in connection
with a planned bank robbery who is caught by law enforcement with a
175
shotgun in the process of executing the robbery.
The admission in
evidence of the defendant’s writings that referred to committing crimes with
176
shotguns
is not a problem, even in light of the defendant’s First
177
Amendment objection that the writings show only his abstract beliefs.
This is so because when actual conduct occurs, the outcome reliability
concerns inherent in using speech as evidence of a speech crime are largely
absent. In other words, the conduct of possessing the gun lends great
relevancy to the speech. When actual conduct takes place, the All-Purpose
Speech Model poses no real problem.
Second, a defendant accused of selling drugs might have explicitly
discussed with co-conspirators the amount of drugs involved in their
178
crime.
Admission of these discussions is also not a concern, even if no
drugs are found. This case does not present serious All-Purpose Speech
Model concerns because the speech is unambiguously associated with
179
legitimately criminal activity.
The First Circuit’s approach in the landmark conspiracy case, United
States v. Spock, refers to both of these occasions. Limiting the use of speech
to prove mens rea, the Court wrote:
When the alleged agreement is both bifarious and political within the
shadow of the First Amendment, we hold that an individual’s specific
intent to adhere to the illegal portions may be shown in one of three
ways: by the individual defendant’s prior or subsequent unambiguous
statements; by the individual defendant’s subsequent commission of the very
illegal act contemplated by the agreement; or by the individual
172

173

174

175
176
177
178
179

See GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 245
(“[F]reedom to say what one feels and believes and hopes to do does not constitute
freedom from use of one’s statements as evidence.”).
Thomas I. Emerson, however, shared this opinion. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 405
(“[E]xpression may be seriously inhibited when the speaker knows that what he says can
be used against him at a later time . . . or can perhaps be the decisive factor in a jury’s
general verdict against him.”).
See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 185 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1969) (Coffin, J., dissenting in
part) (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943)) (“[T]here
is . . . justification . . . [for] fearing expansion of conspiracy into the realm of public
discussion. . . . Of course, closely-knit groups directed at the execution of orthodox
criminal enterprises are clearly punishable as conspiracies.”).
United States v. Brown, 374 Fed. App’x 927, 930 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 930, 937.
Id. at 937.
United States v. Padilla-Gonzalez, 418 Fed. App’x 590, 592 (9th Cir. 2011).
In Part IV of this Article, I discuss such speech as operational and integral to criminal
conduct.
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defendant’s subsequent legal act if that act is “clearly undertaken for the
specific purpose of rendering effective the later illegal activity which is
180
advocated.”

B. Why Do Problems Arise?
The pursuit of all inchoate crimes poses an inherent danger of
181
erroneous outcomes.
Expanded use of the prevention paradigm,
unaffiliated model, and specific crime exceptions all encourage law
enforcement intervention at ever earlier points in time. While this may
serve public safety, it also intensifies problems associated with the AllPurpose Speech Model. Invoking these problems, Eugene Volokh asked:
Would you feel safe writing an article describing how easily people can
illegally make [a] drug, and using that as an argument for why it’s
pointless to keep the drug illegal, when you know that your past praise of
the drug might persuade a jury that the article is really intended to
182
facilitate crime?

Volokh pointed to the problematic use of speech when there is no actual
conduct to vouch for its reliability or when the speech used is dubiously
probative of criminal intent or agreement.
Courts have failed to address this problem because they have focused
only on speech-as-crime. Contrary to the holdings in a prominent line of
183
cases, conspiracy charges largely do away with defendants’ speech rights

180
181

182
183

United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1969) (quoting Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 234 (1961)) (emphasis added).
See Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1173 (1997) (“[A]lthough the Model Penal Code’s approach to
conditional purpose is the most defensible approach, it leads to counter-intuitive results
in many cases.”).
See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 10, at 1189.
Some have said that Dennis v. United States established that the First Amendment protects
some speech in the conspiracy context. In the context of this Article, Dennis is
appropriately viewed as a traditionalist First Amendment case in that it is concerned
solely with speech itself as a crime. In that context, the Court wrote that, “where an
offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction relying
upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only when the speech or
publication created a ‘clear and present danger’ of attempting or accomplishing the
prohibited crime, e.g., interference with enlistment.” 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951). The
Dennis majority concerned itself with speech as a crime and did not appreciate the allpurpose speech problem presented in this Article. Justices Black and Douglas in dissent,
however, did point to this Article’s concern. Id. at 579, 585 (Black, Douglas, JJ.,
dissenting). A decade later, the Court reiterated the Dennis approach in Scales v. United
States, writing that:
[T]here is no great difference between a charge of being a member in a group
which engages in criminal conduct and being a member of a large conspiracy,
many of whose participants are unknown or not before the court. Whatever
difficulties might be thought to inhere in ascribing a course of criminal conduct to
an abstract entity are certainly cured, so far as any particular defendant is
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altogether, in part because those cases do not recognize the dual nature of
the All-Purpose Speech Model. Thus, when the First Circuit in Spock said,
“the important lesson of Noto, Scales and Yates [is] that one may belong to a
group, knowing of its illegal aspects, and still not be found to adhere
184
thereto,” it was expressing a normative hope, resting on a presumed, but
185
largely inoperative, balancing test.
Membership in such groups cannot
itself be criminal, but it can be used as evidence of conspiracy, which in turn
establishes the crime itself.

C. Structure of the Problem
1. Agreement
186

An agreement to commit a crime lies at the heart of conspiracy law. It
187
is a necessary actus reus and can also indicate the mens rea of the
188
conspirators.
At first blush, the fact that the agreement can perform this
dual role is not a conceptual concern: an agreement to commit a crime is
surely evidence of someone’s criminal state of mind. There are other
characteristics, however, that raise All-Purpose Speech Model issues.
189
Circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove an agreement.
There
need not be an explicit offer and acceptance to engage in a criminal

184
185
186

187
188
189

concerned, by the requirement of proof that he knew that the organization
engages in criminal advocacy, and that it was his purpose to further that criminal
advocacy.
367 U.S. at 226 n.18. The Court’s concern was merely to ensure that criminal intent was
proven; it did not confront the all-purpose speech problem or even greatly question the
ambiguous nature of some speech to prove intent. In the same year, however, the Court
in Noto v. United States did suggest an appreciation of the all-purpose speech problem. 367
U.S. 290, 298 (1961) (“But in examining that evidence it appears to us that, in the
context of this record, this too fails to establish that the Communist Party was an
organization which presently advocated violent overthrow of the Government now or in
the future, for that is what must be proven. The most that can be said is that the evidence
as to that program might justify an inference that the leadership of the Party was
preparing the way for a situation in which future acts of sabotage might be facilitated, but
there is no evidence that such acts of sabotage were presently advocated; and it is present
advocacy, and not an intent to advocate in the future or a conspiracy to advocate in the
future once a groundwork has been laid, which is an element of the crime under the
membership clause.”).
416 F.2d at 179.
Id. at 170.
Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S.
49, 53 (1942); Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir.
1999); United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 511 (10th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (citing Regina v. Bass, (1795) 88 Eng.
Rep. 881, 882).
Ohlin, supra note 15.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007); Theatre Enters., Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
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conspiracy; the agreement may be inferred from evidence of concert of
190
A
action among people who work together to achieve a common end.
191
tacit understanding may be sufficient, as may be “the working relationship
between the parties that has never been articulated but nevertheless amount
192
to a joint criminal enterprise.”
As Abraham Goldstein wrote, “[t]he illusory quality of agreement is
increased by the fact that it, like intent, must inevitably be based upon
assumptions about what people acting in certain ways must have had in
193
mind.”
Although mere presence, guilty knowledge, and even close
association with an alleged co-conspirator are insufficient on their own to
194
prove a conspiracy,
they may be considered to raise a permissible
195
inference of participation in a conspiracy. By piling on evidence of “bad”
speech and associations, prosecutors can paint a picture of a conspiracy
196
where in reality there is none.
This presents difficulties for juries. How can juries determine what is an
agreement and what is mere presence or close association? Assuming jurors
are able to do so, how are they to process the apparent contradiction that
presence or association cannot be used alone to prove an agreement, but
may be used to infer participation in the conspiracy? These problems are
exacerbated by the fact that conspiracy is believed to be characterized by
secrecy and is therefore usually difficult to prove except by inferences drawn
197
from the conduct of the parties.
The practical results of these problems are twofold. First, prosecutors
will introduce as massive an amount of evidence as possible in the hope that
more evidence of presence, knowledge, and association will inundate

190

191

192
193
194
195
196

197

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946); United States v.
Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340,
1348 (9th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1029 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Simon, 839 F.2d 1461, 1469 (11th Cir. 1988); WRIGHT, supra note 12.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948); United States v. Concemi,
957 F.2d 942 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 241–42 (1st Cir.
1990)); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992).
United States v. Wiener, 3 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Townsend,
924 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1991).
Goldstein, supra note 1, at 410.
United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 1995).
United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v.
Kincade, 714 F.2d 1064, 1065 (11th Cir. 1983)).
There has, in fact, been confusion about what agreement conceptually entails. See
Theodore W. Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 VA. L. REV. 898, 909
(1937) (discussing “confusion” regarding agreement in federal courts).
United States v. Muse, No. 06 Cr. 600(DLC), 2007 WL 1989313, at * 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 3,
2007); United States v. Ailsworth, 948 F. Supp. 1485, 1506 (D. Kan. 1996); JOSEPH F.
MCSORLEY, A PORTABLE GUIDE TO FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES
FOR CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES 12–13 (2d ed. 2003).
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199

jurors and compel them to find an agreement. This rests on an a priori
assumption that a conspiracy exists. “The trial becomes a vehicle for
constant shaping and forming of the crime, through colloquies among court
and counsel, as each new item of evidence is offered by the prosecution to
fill out an agreement whose scope will be unknown until the entire process
200
is completed.”
Second, given the apparent difficulty in proving
conspiracies because of their secrecy, courts relax standards of proof in favor
of the prosecution in ways that affect the relevance inquiry for determining
201
admissibility of evidence.
The fact that co-conspirator hearsay is
202
203
admissible facilitates these processes.
If there are terrorism and drug

198
199

200
201

202
203

See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 878 (warning that “the
volume of evidence produced by a trial of several defendants may overwhelm the jury”).
See United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing how a jury was
confused by “the plethora of evidence implicating the other sixteen indicted codefendants”); EMERSON, supra note 4, at 410 (“[T]he wide sweep of a conspiracy charge,
and the multiplicity of participants, make it possible for the prosecution to claim that
broad areas of expression are relevant to the case.”).
Goldstein, supra note 1, at 412.
See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1947) (“Secrecy and concealment
are essential features of a successful conspiracy. . . . Hence the law rightly gives room for
allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature
of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all
its details or of the participation of others.”); United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134
(3d Cir. 2005) (citing Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 557) (“[T]he very nature of the crime of
conspiracy is such that it often may be established only by indirect and circumstantial
evidence. Thus, ‘[t]he existence of a conspiracy “can be inferred from evidence of
related facts and circumstances from which it appears as a reasonable and logical
inference, that the activities of the participants . . . could not have been carried on except
as the result of a preconceived scheme or common understanding.”’” (citation omitted));
United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Because ‘[s]ecrecy and
concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy,’ direct evidence of conspiracy
is often hard to come by. Therefore, conspiracy convictions may be based on
circumstantial evidence, and the jury may infer conspiracy from the defendants’ conduct
and other circumstantial evidence indicating coordination and concert of action.”
(citations omitted)).
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
Blank, supra note 144, at 740–41 (arguing that the War on Terror upends delicate legal
balances and thus threatens individual rights).
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204

they compound what can be called the “conspiracy
exceptions,
205
exception.”
The agreement is the lynchpin element in conspiracy cases. This could
have led courts either to make it more or less difficult to prove. Given the
widely held belief that conspiracies are difficult to prove, courts have given
206
the prosecution great advantages in proving an agreement.
This means
that the agreement element does not pose a significant barrier to a
conspiracy charge, and it is difficult for the defendant to disprove whenever
multi-person inchoate activity is implicated in the criminal process.

2. Overt Act
In addition to an agreement, proof of a conspiracy usually requires an
207
208
overt act. Its primary purpose is to show the operation of the conspiracy.
Put another way, the requirement of an overt act represents an
acknowledgement that talk (the agreement) is cheap. A second purpose of

204

205

206

207

208

See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court has become a “loyal foot soldier” in the war on drugs); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
opinion as incorporating a “drug exception” into the Constitution); Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 686–87 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
“war on drugs” does not provide sufficient justification for an invasion of privacy);
Wisotsky, supra note 147, at 890 (arguing that Constitutional protections have been
eroded by the war on drugs).
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568–69 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(rejecting the clear and present danger test when a criminal charge involves “a wellorganized, nationwide conspiracy”).
See EMERSON, supra note 4, at 409 (“[T]he use of conspiracy prosecution relaxes the
ordinary rules of evidence . . . and usually affords the prosecuting officials other
significant advantages.”); Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 877–78
(“[O]n the theory that conspiratorial agreements are secret and hence seldom
susceptible to direct proof, courts relax the normal rules of evidence.” (footnote
omitted)).
This is not always the case. In Title 21 drug conspiracy prosecutions, for example, the
state need not prove that the defendant committed an overt act. United States v.
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F.2d 307, 308 (D.C. Cir.
1987). Some conspiracies to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization
do not have an overt act requirment either. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); United States
v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“In drafting section § 2339B,
Congress omitted any language requiring an overt act.”). Nor do conspiracies to commit
money laundering. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 211 (2005) (holding that
conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering does not require a showing of an
overt act).
See United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 334) (explaining the function of the overt act requirement is to “show the
operation of the conspiracy”).
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the overt act is to provide a locus pœnitentiæ, or a chance for a conspirator to
209
withdraw from the conspiracy without accruing any liability.
The overt act requirement is intended to limit the definition of
conspiracies and ensure that only people who have actually conspired are
indicted. The requirement should, for example, prevent mere braggarts
from being prosecuted for “agreeing” to rob a bank or kill a political figure
with whom they particularly disagree. In fact, it is so easy to prove an overt
act that the element has little meaning at all.
The overt act need not be illegal in and of itself. It can be a very minor
210
211
act, including making a phone call, traveling to another city, watching a
212
213
214
video, sending a text message, or giving or receiving directions.
Almost anything that the prosecution can show furthered the alleged
conspiracy in any way will be admitted in evidence. Because the overt act
can be something very minor, its role as a locus pœnitentiæ is not a strong one;
if the government wants to prosecute someone, it can easily find an overt act
215
to charge.
216
Having found an overt act, jurors may use it to infer an agreement.
This is circular logic that collapses the separate actus rei of agreement and
overt act into one. For example, we know that defendants agreed to rob a

209

210
211
212

213

214

215
216

See United States v. Olmstead, 5 F.2d 712, 714 (W.D. Wash. 1925) (“The purpose of the
overt act is to afford a locus pœnitentiæ, when either or all of the conspirators may
abandon the unlawful purpose.”);
See, e.g., Bartoli v. United States, 192 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1951) (holding that
telephone conversations between defendant and co-conspirators “were all overt acts”).
See, e.g., United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 911 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that
“traveling to Las Vegas” was one of a set of actions that constituted an overt act).
See, e.g., Second Superseding Indictment at 3, 13, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR10017-GAO (D. Mass. June 17, 2010) (alleging that defendants commited an overt act
when they watched “jihadi videos”).
See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, No. 10-00244-04-CR-W-DW, 2011 WL 1585601, at *5
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2011) (noting, in an order denying motion to sever defendants and
granting motion to sever counts, that the prosecution alleged that “us[ing] the internet
to send a text message” was an overt act).
See United States v. Rose, 315 F.3d 956, 958 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant
“carried out overt acts in furtherance of his threats by . . . finding [the victim’s] address,
determining its location and obtaining directions to the site); United States v. Gosselin,
62 M.J. 349, 354 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (noting that defense counsel conceded at oral argument
that “giving directions” was an overt act); Kang v. Giurbino, No. CV 07–5693–AHM
(RCF), 2010 WL 3834884, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010) (noting that the jury found
defendants committed overt act when they “assaulted [the victim], threatened to kill her,
threw her on the bed, bound her hands and feet, [and] forced her to give them her
address and directions to her house”).
See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 878 (arguing that the overt act
“requirement is seldom more than a formality”).
See Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2059 n.2 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[O]vert acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficient to permit a jury
to infer that a conspiratorial agreement was reached . . . .”).
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bank because they bought ski masks. Buying ski masks constitutes an overt
act because the defendants agreed to rob the bank. This logic encourages
proof by verbosity and so prosecutors will inundate the jury with massive
217
As
amounts of apparently damning evidence that may not be probative.
actus rei are piled into evidence, the prosecutor simultaneously and
218
effortlessly proves the mens rea, and vice versa.
Otherwise protected speech can be used as an overt act. For example, a
defendant’s statement, “[t]he banking system is unjust and we need to do
everything we can to undermine it,” may be relevant to proving motive or
intent to form a conspiracy to rob a bank. To say that this statement
furthers the conspiracy, however, is often a tenuous argument, but one that
219
220
courts accept.
Other countries and the United States, in treason trials,
prohibit the use of speech as an overt act.
a. Treason
As the only crime enumerated in the United States Constitution, and
221
one that explicitly requires an overt act, treason provides an originalist
vantage point for a discussion about the use of speech to prove conspiracy’s
elements. It suggests that the law should treat conspiracy’s overt act as not
only quantitatively more than some minor and legal act, but also
qualitatively different than mere speech, however “bad.”
Courts have held uniformly that treason’s overt act must be actual
222
conduct; it may not be speech in any form. This is so because the overt act

217

218

219
220
221
222

See United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 125 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a jury in a
conspiracy trial was unduly influenced by “a plethora of evidence” introduced by the
prosecution).
Nathan R. Sobel, The Anticipatory Offenses in the New Penal Law: Solicitation, Conspiracy,
Attempt and Facilitation, 32 BROOK. L. REV. 257, 264 (1966) (“[P]ractical experience is
convincing that the requisite mens rea is extremely difficult to establish absent an overt act
which signals the intent to move the project forward from talk to action.”).
See United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 887 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that words of
encouragement may be an overt act).
France, for example, requires one or more “overt acts.” CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 450-1
(Fr.).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”).
See Douglas A. Kash, The United States v. Adam Gadahn: A Case for Treason, 37 CAP. U. L.
REV. 1, 23 (2008) (“[O]ne’s sentiments of discontent or utterances of disloyal sentiments
are not sufficient to support the charge of treason.”). But see Tom W. Bell, Treason,
Technology, and Freedom of Expression, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 999, 1026 (2005) (“The World War II
propaganda cases leave no doubt that a speech or publication can constitute an overt act
sufficient to trigger punishment for treason.”); Kristen Eichensehr, Treason’s Return, 116
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 229, 229 (2007) (observing that 2006 prosecution of Adam
Gadahan for participating in propaganda videos resembled World War II-era treason
prosecutions).
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requirement exists to show that the treasonous intent has moved from the
223
Held against the mirror of
realm of thought into the realm of action.
American treason jurisprudence, the use of speech to prove a conspiracy’s
overt act seems overly broad, unfaithful to stare decisis, and even
224
unconstitutional.
In Yates v. United States, Justice Black invoked treason to address the
concerning confluence of speech rights and conspiracy trials, writing, “[t]he
requirement of proof of an overt act in conspiracy cases is no mere
formality, particularly in prosecutions like these [anti-communist trials]
225
which in many respects are akin to trials for treason.”
The high
223

224

225

See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 645 (1947) (“The requirement of an overt act is
to make certain a treasonable project has moved from the realm of thought into the
realm of action.”); Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 7 n.7 (1945) (quoting United
States v. Haupt, 47 F. Supp. 836, 839 (N.D. Ill. 1942) (“[A]n overt act . . . means some
physical action done for the purpose of carrying out or affecting [sic] the treason.”
(alteration in original))); United States v. Werner, 247 F. 708, 710 (E.D. Pa. 1918)
(quoting Charge to Grand Jury—Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1034, 1034 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861))
(“Words oral, written or printed, however treasonable, seditious or criminal of
themselves, do not constitute an overt act of treason, within the definition of the crime.”);
Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 886–87 (Ohio C.C. 1863) (“[H]ow is it possible that
words, merely as such, should ‘amount’ to treason? The crime requires an overt act.”).
Indeed, Justice Douglas questioned whether a conspiracy’s overt act could be proven by
constitutionally protected activity. The question has gone unanswered. See Epton v. New
York, 390 U.S. 29, 31 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court “has never
decided whether activities protected by the First Amendment can constitute overt acts for
purposes of a conviction for treason”). Courts uniformly acquiesce to the assumption
that when speech is used to prove a conspiracy’s agreement and overt act, the First
Amendment is not implicated. See, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 537 (5th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)) (“It is well
established under First Amendment principals that there is no prohibition on ‘the
evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime . . . .’”)); United States v.
Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “reading material” evidence
which would otherwise be constitutionally protected could be admitted as evidence);
United States v. Berringer, 601 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (holding that
constitutionally protected pornographic material may be introduced as evidence); Joseph
J. Anclien, Crush Videos and the Case for Criminalizing Criminal Depictions, 40 U. MEM. L. REV.
1, 10–11 (2009) (listing criminal conduct that is not protected by the First Amendment);
Mark A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, The Need for Rational Boundaries in Civil
Conspiracy Claims, 31 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 37, 66 (2010) (arguing that criminal liability “based
on relationships in associations may chill the exercise of fundamental constitutional
rights, namely, freedom of expression and association” (footnote omitted)); Malick W.
Ghachem, Of “Scalpels” and “Sledgehammers”: Religious Liberty and the Policing of Muslim
Charities in Britain and America Since 9/11, 9 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 25, 52 n.113
(2010) (“[I]n certain areas of the law, such as criminal solicitation and conspiracy or
securities regulation, the First Amendment is simply held not to apply.”) (citing Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004)); EMERSON, supra note 4, at 409 (“It can readily be
seen that the law of conspiracy reaches far back into inchoate conduct and has serious
implications for the system of freedom of expression.” (footnote omitted)).
354 U.S. 298, 342 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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evidentiary bar set for proof of treason was necessary, he said, “to keep
people from being convicted of disloyalty to government during periods of
excitement when passions and prejudices ran high, merely because they
226
expressed ‘unacceptable’ views.”
Justice Douglas revisited this observation twelve years later, writing in
Epton v. New York, “[w]hether the overt act required to convict a defendant
for conspiracy must be shown to be constitutionally unprotected presents an
227
important question.”
He returned to treason: “Although the Court has
indicated that the overt act requirement of the treason clause ensures that
‘thoughts and attitudes alone cannot make a treason’ it has never decided
whether activities protected by the First Amendment can constitute overt
228
acts for purposes of a conviction for treason.”
His question has gone
229
unanswered.

3. Actus Reus and Mens Rea
If the Framers were concerned that talk was cheap, at least in the treason
context, criminal law has similarly been concerned with how to prove that
someone actually meant to do the crime of which he was accused. Lord
Coke developed the principle actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, or “an act
230
does not make a person guilty unless [his] mind is also guilty.” From this
principle emerged the separate concepts of actus reus and mens rea.
The concepts of actus reus and mens rea are meant to perform different
tasks. Actus reus is meant to ensure that an act that is prohibited actually
took place. Mens rea is meant to ensure that if the act took place, the actor
231
had a guilty state of mind. The two concepts have, for good reason, been
conceptually separated from each other, though some have been skeptical
232
that they are, in reality, distinct.
226
227

228
229
230

231

232

Id. at 343 (citing Cramer, 325 U.S. at 48).
390 U.S. 29, 31 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66,
75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“There is a question concerning some of the overt
acts—whether . . . a constitutionally protected right such as speech or assembly may be
used as an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy.”).
Epton, 390 U.S. at 31 (internal citations omitted).
See Bell, supra note 222, at 1030 (noting that the Supreme Court has not decided whether
protected speech can constitute an overt act).
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES
107 (M. Flesher et al. 1600); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1(a), at
333 (2d ed. 2003).
See People v. Torres, 848 P.2d 911, 914 (Colo. 1993) (defining mens rea as “a culpable
mental state”); Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 800 (Md. 1993) (defining mens rea as “the
guilty mind or mental state accompanying a forbidden act”).
See, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70 (2d. ed. 1960); DOUGLAS
N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 91 (1987).
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233

but acknowledged that
Michael Moore rejected this skepticism,
234
“complex action” crimes do see a merger of actus reus and mens rea. He
235
noted conspiracy’s complexity, and so his discussion of actus reus in that
236
crime indicated its merger with the crime’s mens rea.
The All-Purpose
Speech Model highlights this merger; in speech, however ambiguous, a
237
prosecutor can find both actus reus and evidence of mens rea.
The
prevention paradigm means that the probity of speech is increasingly
doubtful as government pursues potential crimes at earlier and earlier
stages. This means that alleged agreements are even more inferred, and
prosecutors attempt to prove them by even more ambiguous speech. Lines
blur even further, and proof of actus reus and mens rea become less
238
distinct.

4. Actus Reus and Evidence Thereof
Just as prosecutors can find both actus reus and evidence of mens rea in
the same speech, they can similarly find both actus reus and evidence
thereof. Al-Hussayen’s website administration, for example, provided the
overt act, evidence of the agreement, and evidence of his mens rea to
support his conspiracy charge. This once again amounts to circular logic:
we know Al-Hussayen agreed to provide material support because he
engaged in an overt act in its furtherance, and we know this was an overt act
because he had agreed to provide material support.

233
234

235
236
237

238

MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR CRIMINAL LAW 171–77 (1993).
Id. at 174 (noting specifically that in complex action crimes, “there is indeed a blending
of the actus reus and mens rea requirements in the sense that one cannot have satisfied the
actus reus requirement for such crimes without also having satisfied the mens rea
requirement of such crimes”).
Id. at 225.
Id. at 220–21.
See Jackson, supra note 147, at 527 (“While American criminal law is firmly based on the
theory that a defendant must demonstrate the requisite mens rea (the intent to commit a
crime) and actus reus (the actual criminal conduct), conspiracy law provides an
exception to the act requirement of criminal prosecutions. Critics of conspiracy laws
argue that it violates the very foundation of our criminal justice system because it is
predominately mental and rises to the level of punishing an individual for thoughts
rather than acts.” (footnotes omitted)).
This is to say nothing of the problem of proving mens rea itself in the context an
inchoate crime. See Alexander & Kessler, supra note 181, at 1139 (noting that “[f]or an
inchoate crime such as conspiracy, solicitation, or incomplete attempt” criminal codes
impose a purpose requirement that is “ambiguous in two respects”).
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IV. A STRUCTURE OF SPEECH
While conspiracy law has failed to address the problems associated with
the All-Purpose Speech Model, speech law has similarly been unsuccessful.
What is needed is a typology of speech that illustrates how conspiracy law
threatens free speech. Two preexisting systems, the category of speech
239
integral to criminal conduct and Kent Greenawalt’s tripartite structure of
240
speech, provide good starting points. From these structures a new fourpart typology emerges that reveals the threat and, in the future, may guide
questions of admissibility based on whether the speech in question is
necessary, facilitative, or merely related to a conspiracy, and whether the
speech is aspirational or operational. I call this the Conspiracy Specific
Speech Typology.

A. Pre-Existing Structures
1. Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct
Speech integral to criminal conduct (“integral speech”) provides insight
into the use of speech to prove a conspiracy charge. At its simplest, if speech
241
is integral to a conspiracy, then it is not protected. Conversely, if speech is
not integral, then it may be protected. It makes sense that speech that
comprises a conspiracy’s agreement or overt act is integral, and so can be
prohibited. This is fine as far as its goes, which is not very far. As we will see,
case law leaves us wanting an adequate definition of integral speech,
especially in the conspiracy context. In addition, integral speech says
nothing about speech as evidence of actus reus or mens rea.
242
Only a small number of cases mention the category of integral speech.
243
Fittingly, only a small amount of scholarship touches on the category.

239

240
241

242

EMERSON, supra note 4, at 406 (“Perhaps the best formulation that can be made . . . is that
there must be an unusually close connection between the expression and the action, that
the expression must be an integral part of the action.”).
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 43, 57.
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1599–1600 (2010) (noting that the First
Amendment would not, in and of itself, be an automatic bar to statutory criminal liability
for videographers engaged in a conspiracy to make live recordings to satisfy an
underground market for videos of sadistic acts of animal cruelty); see also Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (in the context of a case involving
picketers of a commercial enterprise, noting that it “rarely has been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing
used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute”).
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584; United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 670, 671 n.4, 683 (9th
Cir. 2011); Powell’s Books, Inc. v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 1212 n.15 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2010); Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d
974, 991 (7th Cir. 2010); Quiney v. Brooks, 2:10-CV-01676-GMN, 2011 WL 1327856, at *3
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These sources say little of substance about integral speech; none provide an
adequate exegesis of the category. One commentator does offer an explicit,
if terse, explanation. He refers to integral speech as that which constitutes a
244
“speech act” that furthers a crime. In other words, integral speech is that
245
type of speech that is viewed less as speech and more as a “vehicle” that
246
moves a criminal enterprise forward.
Beyond that, the legal opinions and articles that apply integral speech
247
are unhelpful in defining the category. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,

243

244
245
246

247

(D. Nev. Apr. 5, 2011); Garcia v. Newtown Twp., 819 F. Supp. 2d 416, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2011);
United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44, 56 (D.D.C. 2011); United States v. Larson, 807
F. Supp. 2d 142, 150, 163 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. Martinez, No. 10-60332-CR,
2011 WL 1099261, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2011); United States v. Robbins, 759 F. Supp.
2d 815, 817 n.3 (W.D. Va. 2011); Bass v. Hansen, No. 09-CV-1087, 2010 WL 5069690, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2010); Policastro v. Tenafly Bd. of Educ., 710 F. Supp. 2d 495, 504
(D.N.J. 2010).
See, e.g., J. Matthew Barnwell, Note, Taking a Bite Out of Speech Regulation: The Supreme
Court Upholds First Amendment Protection for Depictions of Animal Cruelty in United States v.
Stevens, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1031, 1035, 1041 (2011); Andrew A. Beerworth, United States
v. Stevens: A Proposal for Criminalizing Crush Videos Under Current Free Speech Doctrine, 35 VT.
L. REV. 901, 908, 915, 920 (2011); Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and EMails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 21 DEPAUL J. ART,
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 1 n.3 (2010); Clay Calvert & Rebekah Rich, Low-Value
Expression, Offensive Speech, and the Qualified First Amendment Right to Lie: From Crush Videos
to Fabrications about Military Medals, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2010); Carol Federighi,
Regulating Slate Mailers: Consumer Protection or First Amendment Infringement?, 14 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 567, 575 n.51 (1992); Beatrice M. Hahn, The More Things Change, The
More They Stay the Same: Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 6 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 111, 114 (2011); Thomas B. McAffee, Overcoming
Lochner in the Twenty-First Century: Taking Both Rights and Popular Sovereignty Seriously as
We Seek to Secure Equal Citizenship and Promote the Public Good, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 597, 619
(2008); Allen T. McGlynn, The Constitutional Ramifications of Calling a Police Officer an
“Asshole,” 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 741, 743 (1992); Isaac Molnar, Comment, Resurrecting the Bad
Tendency Test to Combat Instructional Speech: Militias Beware, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1348
n.112 (1998); Robert Rigg, The Not-So-Risky Business of High-End Escorts and the Internet in
the 21st Century, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 26 n.47 (2010); Nadine Strossen, United States v.
Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-Based Speech Restrictions, 2010 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 80, 81 n.72, 85; Christina Wells, Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v.
Phelps, Emotion, and the First Amendment, 1 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 71, 79 n.56 (2010).
Molnar, supra note 243, at 1348 n.112.
Powell’s Books, Inc., 622 F.3d at 1212 n.15.
I refer to this type of speech as “operational” speech, or speech that effects a change in
the position of people, goods, or services. In contrast, I refer to “aspirational” speech,
which is speech that is intended to communicate or persuade. “Put all the small bills in a
bag and give it to me,” for example, is operational and is quasi-conduct because it directly
results in a change in the position of the teller, the money, and the bag just as if the bank
robber were to have put the money in the bag himself. “If you were to steal money from
the bank, you’d be striking a blow at the unjust banking system” is aspirational. It is
meant to communicate an idea and persuade opinion, not to effect a specific change in
any position. I discuss aspirational and operational speech more in Part IV.
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949).
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which formally introduced the category in 1949, complicates the issue.
United States v. Stevens, which gave the category contemporary life in 2010, is
248
also unhelpful.

2. What is “Integral” Speech?
In four cases, the category of integral speech has been prominent, if
249
250
implicitly so. These cases are United States v. Stevens, New York v. Ferber,
251
252
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, and Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.
They leave a definition of integral speech undetermined.
In Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment protected
253
certain depictions of animal cruelty.
Some have argued that Stevens
breathed new life into the integral speech category. This is an overly
optimistic view, because Stevens merely mentioned integral speech in a list of
254
other categories of speech that enjoyed no First Amendment protection.
It did so merely to illustrate that the First Amendment does not imply
255
absolute protection for all speech.
The Stevens Court refrained from expanding on its use of New York v.
256
Ferber to develop the integral speech category. In Ferber, the Court held
that child pornography was an unprotected category of speech because
“[t]he market for child pornography was ‘intrinsically related’ to the
underlying abuse, and was therefore ‘an integral part of the production of
257
such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.’”
The Ferber
Court thus presented a consequentialist approach to understanding integral
speech. If speech encourages or results in some other illegal conduct, then
it is integral and unprotected. The Court’s approach was fundamentally one
258
of managing the effect in order to thwart the underlying illegal cause.
259
Justice Alito, dissenting in Stevens, adopted Ferber’s consequentialist theory.

248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Id.
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1577 (2010).
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
Giboney, 336 U.S. 490.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582, 1592.
Id. at 1584.
Id.
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759).
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 n.13 (“The act of selling these materials is guaranteeing that there
will be additional abuse of children.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1601.
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Although the Ferber Court reached the correct normative result, it confused
260
the category of integral speech.
Integral speech is more correctly and elegantly a deontological
261
category.
To be “integral,” speech must be a part of, and not a result of,
criminal conduct. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court suggested
Ferber’s miscategorization, holding that virtual child pornography was
262
generally protected. It so held because virtual child pornography did not
263
result from actual child sexual abuse.
The Court could have given
deference to Congress’ determination that virtual child pornography harms
264
children in less direct ways.
Instead, the Court adopted a deontological
approach, implicitly rejecting the Ferber analysis and stating that the law
prohibiting virtual child pornography prohibited speech that was attached
265
to no crime.
The Giboney opinion provides the first explicit acknowledgment of the
266
integral speech category, to which Stevens and Ferber were later to refer. It
does not invoke Ferber’s consequentialist approach, preferring instead a
deontological one. Even within that view, however, Giboney leaves us wanting
a definition.
Giboney considered a labor dispute in which union members attempted
267
to pressure a wholesale ice company to deal only with union ice peddlers.
Union members engaged in conduct that was in violation of the state’s
268
antitrade restraint law. They also operated pickets that were peaceful and
269
published only truthful information.
The specific question was whether
the state could enjoin union members from peaceful picketing “carried on
as an essential and inseparable part of a course of conduct which is in

260

261

262
263
264

265
266
267
268
269

See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 9, at 1325 (discussing Ferber, Volokh noted that
“not all speech that provides a motive for illegal conduct can be outlawed simply because
it is ‘an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute’”).
See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 170 (1st Cir. 1969) (offering that by default, the
court would “start with the assumption that the defendants were not to be prevented
from vigorous criticism of the government’s program merely because the natural
consequences might be to interfere with it, or even to lead to unlawful action” (footnote
omitted)).
535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002).
Id. at 241.
Id. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (“That
evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is entitled to
deference.”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 247 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“Congress’ reasonable conclusions are entitled to deference . . . .”).
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250.
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
762 (1982).
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 493–94, 498.
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270

In other words, if the union was engaged in
violation of the state law.”
conduct to illegally restrain trade, and engaged in speech that was “integral”
to that conduct, could the speech be restricted?
The Court rejected the union position, stating that the picketing could
271
not “be treated in isolation.”
“[T]he sole immediate object of the”
picketing, “as well as the other activities of the [union] was to compel
272
Empire to agree to stop selling ice to nonunion peddlers.”
These “other
activities” included a “powerful transportation combination,” patrolling, and
273
a picket line that warned union members not to cross it.
These activities
plus the “publicizing” at the picketing “constituted a single and integrated
274
course of conduct.”
The Court’s holding that integral speech is not protected is problematic
for two reasons. First, the fact that the Court based its opinion on picketing
that was peaceful and truthful begs the question: if it was peaceful and
truthful, was it truly “integral” to criminal conduct? Second, lending First
Amendment concern to this question, the Court indicated that the speech
275
and the illegal conduct were separable.
The Court could have held that
276
the speech was protected, but not its associated illegal conduct.
Giboney presents three possible definitions of integral speech. The
277
category could include speech that is necessary to executing illegal conduct.
It could include speech that facilitates (and may or may not be necessary to
278
executing) the illegal conduct.
The most likely reading of Giboney is that

270
271
272
273
274
275

276

277
278

Id. at 491–92.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 502 (“Nor can we say that the publication here should not have been restrained
because of the possibility of separating the picketing conduct into illegal and legal
parts.”).
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 173 (1st Cir. 1969) (describing the First Circuit’s
limited use of speech which, “responds to the legitimate apprehension . . . that the evil
must be separable from the good without inhibiting legitimate association in an orderly
society”); Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 9, at 1317 (“If the course of conduct
includes illegality, the theory would go, then the speech part of the course of conduct
would be just as illegal as the action that the speech brings about. This might fit the facts
of Giboney—in which the speaker was trying to pressure the employer into acting
illegally—and of some of the lower court cases that cite Giboney. But such a reading
would be inconsistent with Brandenburg, and with the modern repudiation of cases such as
Schenck and Debs.” (footnote omitted)).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (quoting Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)) (“[I]t has never been deemed an
abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed.”); see Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d
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speech that is merely related to the illegal conduct (and may or may not be
279
If this is the case, then Giboney
facilitative or necessary) is not protected.
raises serious free speech issues that directly implicate the All-Purpose
Speech Model, as we shall see.

3. Greenawalt’s Theory of Speech Acts
280

Kent Greenawalt’s extensive work on speech acts provides the best
extant theoretical base from which to analyze speech’s use in conspiracy
cases. He sets forth a tripartite structure of speech, which includes
“situation-altering utterances,” “assertions of fact and value,” and “weak
281
imperatives.” Although he groups weak imperatives and situation-altering
utterances in the same category, and juxtaposes them with assertions of fact
282
and value, there are meaningful differences between the two.
a. Greenawalt’s Tripartite Structure of Speech
Situation-altering utterances are words that “directly alter[] the social
environment by ‘doing’ something rather than telling something or
recommending something. Examples are words of agreement that commit
people to action and threats that introduce a new danger into victims’
283
lives.”
For Greenawalt, such words can be prohibited without a free

279

280

281
282
283

233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (relying on Giboney in allowing liability for publishing a book that
described how to commit contract murders); see also United States v. Savoie, 594 F. Supp.
678, 682, 685–86 (D. La. 1984) (relying on Giboney in issuing an injunction against,
among other things, the distribution of any document explaining how taxpayers could
“avoid the payment of, or to obtain the refund of, federal income taxes . . . based on the
false proposition that wages, salaries or other forms of compensation for labor or services
not specifically excluded from taxation under Title 26 of the United States Code are not
taxable income”).
See Missouri v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1324 n.15 (8th Cir. 1980) (Gibson,
J., dissenting) (arguing, citing Giboney, that the National Organization for Women’s
advocacy of a boycott of Missouri businesses, aimed at getting Missouri to ratify the Equal
Rights Amendment, might be constitutionally punishable as an antitrust law violation);
Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982) (holding, citing Giboney, that the state
Humane Society’s advocacy of a tourist boycott of a county, aimed at getting the county to
improve its dog pound, could be constitutionally punishable as interference with
prospective business advantage).
KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF
SPEECH (1995) [hereinafter GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS]; GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5; Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the
United States and Canada, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 12–13 (1992) [hereinafter
Greenawalt, Free Speech]; Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42
RUTGERS L. REV. 287, 290 (1990) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Insults].
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS supra note 280, at 7; GREENAWALT, supra note 5, at 43, 57.
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 57.
Greenawalt, Free Speech, supra note 280, at 13.
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284

A situation-altering utterance could be saying “I do” to
speech problem.
285
the priest who asks if you will marry the person next to you, or, in the
conspiracy context, saying the same thing to the person who asks if you
agree to rob a bank with him.
Weak imperatives are “requests and encouragements that do not sharply
alter the listener’s normative environment” because they do not create “new
rights or new obligations or new consequences of [one’s] behavior. Weak
imperatives often indicate beliefs about values and facts and cannot always
286
287
be disentangled from them.”
Weak imperatives are not commands.
288
They are, for example, saying to your roommate, “Please shut the door,”
289
or saying to your co-conspirator, “Kill him, Jack.”
290
Greenawalt does not define assertions of fact and value, as the name of
that category speaks for itself. He does, however, offer nuanced variations of
these assertions. General assertions of fact include, “Physical objects have
291
gravitational force,” and “Your wife has a lover.”
Motivational assertions
are made to achieve an end, and include telling your roommate, “The
292
breeze from the window is making me cold.”
b. Levels of Protection
Greenawalt assigned different levels of First Amendment protection to
his three categories of speech, based on how norm-altering they are.
Assertions of fact and value deserve the highest level of speech protection,
and situation-altering utterances deserve the lowest because they are “ways of
doing things, not of asserting things,” and so are subject to regulation just as
293
is any noncommunicative behavior. Weak imperatives are given a level of
protection between assertions of fact and value and situation-altering
294
utterances, because they are norm-altering but not “sharply” so.
c. Speech on a Continuum
Throughout his work, Greenawalt acknowledges that speech in the real
world does not fall neatly into categories. Rather, it exists on a continuum.
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294

Greenawalt, Insults, supra note 280, at 290.
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 57.
Id.
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 280, at 6.
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 69.
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 69 (1989).
Id. at 43.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 58.
Greenawalt, Insults, supra note 280, at 290.
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For example, weak imperatives in the form of “requests and
295
Greenawalt also
encouragements,” imply assertions of fact and value.
296
groups weak imperatives with situation-altering utterances, thus implying
their overlap. To complete the circle, Volokh has noted that assertions of
fact and value can be situation-altering because they may alter a hearer’s
297
normative environment.

B. Problems With Greenawalt’s Tripartite Structure
Throughout his writing, Greenawalt implies that his structure is not
perfect, and perhaps for that reason attempts to set forth not an absolutely
298
true structure, but one that serves a purpose.
The question, then, is
whether his structure is useful for analyzing the use of speech in conspiracy
299
cases. A better system is possible.
Four criticisms of Greenawalt’s structure in the context of conspiracy
charges present themselves.
They begin from Greenawalt’s
acknowledgement that all three of his categories overlap. In the conspiracy
context, they go far beyond overlapping; they each become as useful as the
others, and in the same ways. This is the blunderbuss problem of speech
admissibility I refer to above. For example, an assertion of fact and value,
“The bank is open from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.,” can be used simultaneously to
infer an agreement, as an overt act, and to prove mens rea. A weak
imperative, “[w]e could really use some ammunition,” and a situationaltering utterance, “I’ll steal the getaway car if you buy the ski masks,” can
both perform the exact same functions.
So the first criticism is that in the conspiracy context, Greenawalt’s three
categories are not meaningfully different. This is so in part because
Greenawalt was concerned with speech as crime, and not with speech as
evidence thereof. Indeed, in expressing his concern that ambiguous speech
or “weak agreements” might wrongly be used to prove a conspiratorial

295
296

297

298
299

GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 69.
See id. at 57 (“The terrain divides itself into two large categories: what I call situationaltering utterances, on the one hand, and requests and encouragements, or what I call
weak imperatives, on the other. With some strain, all my examples might be pressed into
the ‘situation-altering’ category, but to do so would be to obscure how requests and pure
encouragements differ critically from other uses I discuss.”).
See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 9, at 1328 (discussing, for example, how a
newspaper editorial could affect an individual’s behavior not necessarily because of the
facts contained in the editorial but because of their assertive tone).
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 40.
See, e.g., William James, Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth, in THE NATURE OF TRUTH:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 211, 213, 217 (Michael P. Lynch ed., 2001).
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agreement, he remained focused on the speech-as-crime side of the AllPurpose Speech Model. He therefore noted that conspiratorial agreements
301
have never been supposed to raise free speech problems, and, in the end,
“freedom to say what one feels and believes and hopes to do does not
302
constitute freedom from use of one’s statements as evidence.” To prevent
the use of speech as evidence would threaten public safety, and so “we can
simply regard the First Amendment as not ordinarily precluding evidentiary
303
use of what people say.”
The second criticism arises from Greenawalt’s acknowledgement that
ambiguous speech, weak agreements, and, I would add, the fact that
304
agreements can be inferred, create outcome reliability problems.
This is
true as far as he takes it, which is to the use of such speech as the agreement
itself. But this is a problem for the use of speech as evidence as well.
Greenawalt’s focus on speech-as-crime led him to conclude that “[e]ven
305
constitutionally protected communications can help establish intent.” His
examples are too easy: “I will kill Claude,” he says, should be used to prove
that Alice intended to shoot Claude, as should Alice’s statement, “I hate
306
Claude and would like to see him dead.”
Greenawalt’s conclusion is less certain in light of tougher examples.
What if Alice had said the following: “[k]illing is sometimes justified by my
religion, when it is to stop evil people”; “[i]f our leaders can murder people
in drone attacks, then I can kill too”; or “my faith has been shaken over the
last year, so that even killing does not seem immoral anymore.” Consider,
furthermore, that Claude was not actually shot, and that Alice is charged
only with conspiracy to kill Claude. In that case, the use of Alice’s
apparently protected speech is problematic.
The third criticism is that Greenawalt’s structure might protect too much
speech. He says that a speaker’s motives and objective in speaking are
307
irrelevant to determining its protection.
This statement is valid if the
question is only whether a particular speech act should be a crime or not:
situation-altering utterances should not be protected, whatever the speaker’s
motive, because they are like non-communicative behavior, and assertions of

300

301
302
303
304
305
306
307

GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 81
(hypothesizing that a group of young men who agree not to submit to the draft do not
necessarily depend on each other’s involvement to commit the crime, but that conspiracy
could be proven nonetheless).
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 47.
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fact and value should be protected, whatever the speaker’s motive, because
even despite a bad motive, such assertions are located at the First
308
Amendment’s core.
When conspiracy is the alleged crime, a speaker’s intent matters greatly
to infer agreement, provide an overt act, and establish mens rea. If I tell my
friend, “[t]here are three guards at the bank, lightly armed,” this can be
used to infer an agreement and can certainly be considered an overt act
because my intention is that my bank-robbing co-conspirator be informed
309
about the bank’s security apparatus.
One observer has argued that “[t]o
prevent the use of conspiracy law to convict individuals on the basis of their
ideas, courts should bar the use of constitutionally protected public
expression as evidence either of an overt act or of an individual’s specific
310
intent.”
While this would go far in addressing the problems associated
with the All-Purpose Speech Model, it would also throw the relevant baby
out with the problematic bathwater.
The fourth criticism emerges from Greenawalt’s assertion that “weak
311
agreements” can be taken as encouragements and therefore protected.
This may be the normatively right result, but in conspiracy law,
312
encouragements are clearly admissible as overt acts.
Greenawalt’s
structure does not, and cannot, address this important fact.

C. Distilling Greenawalt’s Structure
From Greenawalt’s tripartite structure emerges a more useful two-part
structure, which includes what I call “operational” and “aspirational” speech.
Operational speech is that which effects a change in the position of people,
313
goods, or services.
Aspirational speech is that which is intended to
314
communicate or persuade.
These categories better reflect the interests

308

309
310
311
312
313

314

Id. at 43 (explaining the assertions of fact and value should be protected because
“[c]laims about general facts are critical for people’s understanding of the world they
inhabit, for their choices about how to live, and for their decisions on public issues. The
truth-discovery justification applies strongly to general factual statements, and
suppression of such statements would undermine independence of judgment and
personal development”).
See United States v. Khamsomphou, 111 F. App’x 937, 939 (9th Cir. 2004).
Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 894.
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 240.
United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 328 (5th Cir. 2009).
This is akin to Thomas I. Emerson’s “action” speech. Emerson, supra note 11, at 917
(“Expression often takes place in a context of action, or is closely linked with it, or is
equivalent in its impact.”).
This concept is related to Thomas I. Emerson’s notion of expression. EMERSON, supra
note 4, at 8.
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315

involved in the confluence of speech and conspiracy law : on one hand, we
want to protect people’s right to express themselves freely, through
aspirational speech, but we also want to allow operational speech to be used
against a conspiracy defendant.
This two-part structure is a reformulation of Greenawalt’s tripartite
structure. Recall that he grouped situation-altering utterances and weak
imperatives in the same category because they are both norm-altering.
These two types of speech track well with operational speech; both are used
to effect a real change in the world. Similarly, both assertions of fact and
value and aspirational speech are meant to communicate ideas or facts often
for core First Amendment purposes.
The two-part structure is more useful than Greenawalt’s structure in the
conspiracy context because the two-part structure labels speech in ways that
316
are more relevant to conspiracy law.
Greenawalt wrote that there is no
First Amendment problem to admitting speech when “new commitments
317
have unambiguously been undertaken,” and to using speech as an overt
act when “it reveals on its face a criminal intent or is indisputably a step in a
318
criminal plan.” These statements point to operational speech, and would,
as far as they go, leave aspirational speech protected. Furthermore, they
suggest that the important division is between aspirational and operational
speech. To illustrate, statements of fact and value could be operational
(“The guards change shifts at 3 P.M.”), as could weak imperatives (“We need
319
320
some guns”). Both, in turn, could be clearly situation-altering. A robber
could point a gun at someone and say, “give me your money or I will pull the
trigger.” The robber could achieve the same result by cornering the victim,
holding a gun to his side, away from the victim, and say, “I’m out of work, I
need money, and this economic downturn is making me really desperate.
I’d be grateful if you could help a guy out.” The victim will certainly take

315

316
317
318
319

320

Indeed, Thomas I. Emerson suggested as much. Emerson, supra note 11, at 955 (“[T]he
essence of a system of freedom of expression lies in the distinction between expression
and action.”). Eugene Volokh also may have implied this two-part structure. See Volokh,
Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 10, at 1217; Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 9, at
1284 (“Expression can generally be regulated to prevent harms that flow from its
noncommunicative elements (noise, traffic obstruction, and the like), but not harms that
flow from what the expression expresses.” (footnote omitted)).
This view reflects Thomas I. Emerson’s two-part typology of group association, dividing it,
as he did, between “expression” and “action.” Emerson, supra note 3, at 24–25.
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 240.
Id. at 246.
See Volokh, Speech as Conduct, supra note 9, at 1285 (“[T]here are many examples of
speech that alters people’s felt moral obligations, but that nonetheless seems to be pure
speech rather than conduct.”).
Id. at 1328.
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this as a situation-altering utterance, but it contains only assertions of fact
and a weak imperative.
The Court in Dennis v. United States and Yates v. United States invoked, if
obliquely, the two-part structure. In both cases, the government brought
conspiracy charges based on aspirational speech. In Dennis, the defendants
321
“agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date.”
They did not organize the communist party, but agreed to organize it, and
they did not teach or advocate the overthrow of the government, but merely
322
agreed to do so. In Yates, the Court reaffirmed the notion that aspirational
speech in the form of organization and advocacy was subject to Smith Act
323
prohibitions.
In reversing the defendants’ convictions because they did
not engage in such speech, the Court acknowledged “that distinctions
between advocacy or teaching of abstract doctrines, with evil intent, and that
which is directed to stirring people to action, are often subtle and difficult to
324
grasp.”
For the Court, then, the difference was whether the defendants
merely wanted to communicate an idea, or whether they wanted, through
their words, to effect a change in others that was intended to lead to illegal
conduct.

1. Combining Integral Speech and the Aspirational-Operational Structure
Integral speech and the aspirational-operational structure both provide
325
important contributions and can be combined in a revealing way. In
asking whether certain speech is necessary, facilitative, or merely related to
an alleged conspiracy, we are asking the question posed by the actus reus
requirement: did speech required to prove a crime occur? In asking
whether a certain speech act is aspirational or operational, we are asking the
mens rea question: what did the speaker intend? Although certainly not a
perfect analogy, this does suggest that both structures bring something
important to the question of conspiracy’s threat to free speech.
From integral speech and the aspirational-operational structure, six
categories of speech emerge:
aspirational speech that is necessary,
facilitative, or related to criminal conduct, and operational speech that is
necessary, facilitative, or related to criminal conduct.

321
322
323
324
325

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
Id.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 303–04, 318 (1957).
Id. at 326.
Thomas I. Emerson unintentionally alluded to the confluence of these two structures. See
EMERSON, supra note 4, at 406 (“Perhaps the best formulation that can be made . . . is that
there must be an unusually close connection between the expression and the action, that
the expression must be an integral part of the action . . . .”).
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Aspirational-necessary speech does not actually exist in the real world: if
speech is necessary, it is by definition operational. Similarly, operationalrelated speech also does not exist: if the speech is operational, it is by
definition either necessary or facilitative. We need not, therefore, consider
these categories.
What remains is operational-necessary, operational-facilitative,
aspirational-facilitative, and aspirational-related speech. Normatively and
based on principles of free speech, we start from the initial position that
each of these, in the order presented, becomes more protected and usually
less relevant to proving a conspiracy.
Operational-necessary and
326
operational-facilitative speech tend to pose fewer free speech concerns
327
because they are likely to be relevant and probative and unlikely to include
328
high-value speech such as political or artistic expression.
In turn,
aspirational-facilitative and aspirational-related speech tend to be high329
value. In addition to being “core” First Amendment speech, this speech is
often not necessary to completion of a crime, and may not indicate the
330
requisite mens rea.
This speech is often ambiguous because it either
might carry innocent meaning (“the banking system is unjust”) or it might
be mere bluster that is not probative of a crime (“If they ever make me carry
331
a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights is” the president ).
The four types of speech discussed and the initial levels of protection
and relevance that inhere in each track the speech concerns that conspiracy
law raises. This structure is, therefore, helpful in illustrating the free speech
concerns inherent in the All-Purpose Speech Model.

V. OF CONSPIRACIES AND THREATS TO PRINCIPLES OF FREE SPEECH
The history of the First Amendment is the history of establishing levels of
speech protection based upon principles of free speech, including the
326
327

328

329

330
331

GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 240, 246.
See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, supra note 1, at 894 (arguing that “[w]hen the
non-expressive objective of a group has been accomplished or attempted by means of
both expression and action not incidental to that expression . . . dismissal of the
indictment” is not required).
William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 141
(1982). Of course, this Article challenges this common sense position, arguing that even
high-value political, religious, or artistic speech can be probative or at least appear to be
probative.
See GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 58 (“My
essential claim . . . is that [situation-altering] utterances . . . are outside the scope of a
principle of free speech.”).
Huq, supra note 9.
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (holding that petitioner’s similar
statement in regards to President Johnson were crude political hyperbole and not a
knowing and willful threat).
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search for truth, serving the democratic process and self-government,
334
335
enabling the marketplace of ideas, tolerance, and ensuring individual
336
autonomy and dignity.
Based on these principles, courts and scholars
have placed different types of speech at different levels of protection.
337
Scholars generally conceive of three levels of protection.
The first
division is between speech that is protected, though not absolutely, by the
338
First Amendment, and speech that is not constitutionally protected.
Speech that is not protected by the First Amendment can be called “novalue” speech. Speech that is protected by the First Amendment is
339
340
341
subdivided into high-value
(or “core” ) and regulable
(or “low342
343
344
value” ) speech. High-value speech includes political, public issue,
345
346
religious,
and artistic speech;
regulable speech is, for example,
347
348
commercial speech; and no-value speech includes things like obscenity
332
333
334
335
336
337
338

339
340
341

342

343
344
345
346
347
348
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Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
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IN AMERICA 4 (1986).
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See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
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R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (“[O]ur society . . . has permitted
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such slight
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outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’” (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572)); see also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (“[W]e have
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West, supra note 38, at 1049–50.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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(2011).
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011).
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349

and solicitation to murder. In general, the poles are occupied by political
350
speech as the most protected and criminal speech as the least protected.
In addition to providing a structure for First Amendment analyses, these
levels of protection tell us a lot about what speech is valuable in light of free
speech principles. They also highlight the threats that conspiracy law poses
to these principles. Consider where in this system the parts of conspiracy
law reside. The criminal conspiracy itself is not a speech act, but a criminal
combination of people, and so it is non-speech. Its major element,
agreement, is a speech act, but is so essential to the crime of conspiracy that
it can be considered to be prohibited and unprotected. When an overt act is
required and it consists of speech, that element is also prohibited and
unprotected. If the underlying conspiracy indictment is normatively
acceptable, then there is little concern with free speech at this point.
The problem presented by the All-Purpose Speech Model arises when
the evidence used to infer an agreement and to provide the overt act is
considered. This evidence, which as I have argued becomes essentially the
crime itself, resides at all levels of protection. Al-Hussayen’s and Mehanna’s
speech consisted often of trenchant criticism of the United States’ wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan—certainly a political and public issue of great
importance. Their speech also couched this criticism in religious talk of
jihad, which often had innocent and directly religious meaning. This speech
was high-value, just as was speech engaged in by communists in the 1950s
and hip-hop fans more recently.
Integral speech further illustrates this problem. The Court has held this
351
category to be unprotected, but has failed to recognize its vagaries. This
poses serious questions for free speech. If integral speech means speech
that is necessary to achieve a criminal aim, then the Court was correct in
labeling it unprotected. If integral speech includes facilitative and related
speech, then labeling all integral speech unprotected is conceptually
problematic. Related speech presents the greatest concern. In the Mehanna
case, the defendant spoke in favor of jihad. Such speech was religious,
political, and concerned a public issue, and so in isolation should have been
treated as high-value speech. If Mehanna had actually conspired to provide
349

350
351

See Julia K. Wood, Note, Truth, Lies, and Stolen Valor: A Case for Protecting False Statements of
Fact Under the First Amendment, 61 DUKE L.J. 469, 474 (2011) (discussing “restrictions on
expression that have been accepted as essential to the orderly function of society, such
as . . . the solicitation of murder”).
Van Alstyne, supra note 328, at 141.
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1580 (2010) (holding that “speech
integral to criminal conduct” is unprotected); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490, (1949) (“The constitutional freedom of speech and press does not immunize
speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute.”).
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material support to al Qaeda (a contention I reject, the guilty verdict
notwithstanding), his pro-jihad talk was likely only related to this conspiracy.
For free speech purposes, there is little justification for equating this speech
with orthodox necessary speech: Mehanna’s jihad talk was utterly unlike, for
example, speech engaged in by someone who solicits a spouse’s murder.
The operational-aspirational distinction creates another conceptual
difficulty. There is, to be sure, an important difference between the two
352
types of speech, but it is not obvious that the two types of speech can be
353
distinguished effectively. For example, assuming arguendo that Mehanna
actually wanted to encourage others to fight jihad, he also clearly wanted to
register his opposition to the United States’ military presence in the Middle
East. It is unclear whether this speech should be treated as operational,
aspirational, or both. If it is at least in part aspirational, then its use against
Mehanna puts serious pressure on core First Amendment speech.
Principles of free speech may not be threatened by placing the
agreement and overt act at the level of prohibited unprotected speech.
When, however, evidence in support of these elements comes from all levels
of protection, and when the evidence emerges as the sole manifestation of
the crime of conspiracy itself, these levels are obliterated. In the context of
conspiracy, then, there is no high-value speech—all speech, including
political, religious, and artistic, becomes admissible, and becomes, in effect,
the crime itself.
The logical response to this concern is that criminal conspiracies are
dangerous and even high-value or aspirational speech is relevant to proving
them. In run of the mill conspiracy cases, such as those involving drug
trafficking, child pornography, or insider trading, prosecutorial forbearance
and judicial gatekeeping keep expansive and speech-threatening conspiracy
charges at bay. The conceptual uncertainties inherent in the Conspiracy
Specific Speech Typology are not such a problem in these cases, because the
federal government usually charges only easily provable cases of clear
criminality. In heady times when communists, drug runners, and Islamist
terrorists appear to threaten the country, the government openly engages an

352

353

See Emerson, supra note 4, at 21 (“[That] maintenance of a system of freedom of
expression requires recognition of the distinction between those forms of conduct which
should be classified as ‘expression’ and those which should be classified as ‘action’ . . . .”).
ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 79 (“I believe that none of these attempts to sever
incitement and solicitation from advocacy succeeds. Incitement and solicitation are no
more or less ‘acts’ than any other speech that may cause a harmful response.” (footnote
omitted)); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 71 (1989) (“If the
distinction is between ‘expressing’ and ‘doing,’ most conduct falls into both categories.
Most consciously undertaken actions are at least self-expressive; and many . . . can be
primarily intended to communicate something to others.”).
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354

expansive prevention paradigm. This requires prosecutors to indict those
355
who appear to pose such threats at the earliest possible moment.
While
perceived crises such as the Wars on Communism, Drugs, and Terrorism
may give this approach some justification, they also give currency to free
speech problems associated with the All-Purpose Speech Model.

VI. CONCLUSION
“That darling of the modern prosecutor’s nursery.”
- Judge Learned Hand, on conspiracy law.

356

“[The people’s] darling privilege.”
357

- Congressman Harrison Gray Otis, on freedom of the press.

This Article is about the inseparable relationship between conspiracy law
and speech rights, and the conflict between them. It is also about coming to
358
terms with the implications of a relatively new, but incredibly expansive,
system of free speech. What this system entails remains to be seen.
The All-Purpose Speech Model reveals the threats that conspiracy law
poses to free speech. When speech located at all levels of First Amendment
protection is used as the crime of conspiracy and as evidence thereof, those
levels of protection are obliterated, and the supposedly distinct elements of
conspiracy are recognized as illusory. As these conceptual walls fall, the
threat to free speech increases. The cases of Sami Omar Al-Hussayen and
Tarek Mehanna, and the use of speech related to jihad, communism, and
hip-hop, illustrate this threat.
If this Article has done its job, it should be clear at this point that
conspiracy law puts serious pressure on the principles of free speech. It
leaves for future work the inquiry whether conspiracy law may violate the
First Amendment itself. That subject is an important one, and deserves
more attention than can be paid in these pages. I want, however, to suggest
that the future of speech rights lays, in part, in constitutional challenges to
conspiracy law.

354
355

356
357
358

Gonzales, supra note 151.
See Pollack, supra note 1, at 339 (“It is natural . . . that the crime of conspiracy should have
its origin in a time of social unrest, revolutionary activity, and general insecurity of the
powers in control.”).
Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (2000).
BOLLINGER, supra note 335, at 3; Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 175, 175–76.
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The threshold question is what level of protection should be given to
359
Most scholars assume that the answer is “none at
conspiratorial speech.
360
all.”
There is, however, a substantial countervailing opinion. Kent
Greenawalt has suggested that some, but not all, criminal speech should fall
under the First Amendment’s aegis, and be subject to the “clear and present
361
danger” test and its Brandenburg revision.
Lee Bollinger has also
acknowledged that ordinary criminal behavior can also be political
362
expression, and so raises difficult First Amendment questions.
The
Supreme Court in Dennis would seemingly foreclose many conspiracy
prosecutions on First Amendment grounds with its rule that “where an
offense is specified by a statute in nonspeech or nonpress terms, a conviction
relying upon speech or press as evidence of violation may be sustained only
when the speech or publication created a ‘clear and present danger’ of
363
attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime.”
Assuming that conspiracy’s speech is placed under the aegis of the First
364
Amendment, and thus subject to the Brandenburg test, the next question is
whether this speech is intended and is likely to produce “imminent lawless
365
action.”
Here, too, there are diverging viewpoints. The majority opinion
366
is that the conspiracy itself is dangerous, and so any speech used to
produce it fails the Brandenburg test ab initio and is unprotected.
There are two responses to this. First, the Constitution requires that
367
speech rights be maximized wherever possible.
Speech ought to be

359

360

361
362
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364

365
366

367

See BAKER, supra note 353, at 161 (arguing that “[n]ot all laws that have the effect of
restricting some speech or assembly amount to an abridgement” under the First
Amendment).
Kent Greenawalt, “Clear and Present Danger” and Criminal Speech, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 97, 111 (“It is far preferable to say that
orders deserve no protection whatever.” (footnote omitted)); Van Alstyne, supra note 328,
at 141; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
Kent Greenawalt, “Clear and Present Danger” and Criminal Speech, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 97, 113–19.
Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone, Dialogue to ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN
THE MODERN ERA, supra note 2, at 1, 21.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951).
See ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 76 (“Brandenburg v. Ohio sets forth a test for when
advocacy of harmful acts can be punished without violation of the First Amendment.”
(footnote omitted)).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
Dennis, 341 U.S. at 511; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324 (1959); Larry Alexander
& Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=192434.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should
be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate
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restricted only where the result of protecting it would be a “serious evil”
369
that “rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.” Indeed,
criminal statutes that infringe upon free speech must be particularly
scrutinized: “those [laws] that make unlawful a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they
370
also have legitimate application.”
Second, the danger that conspiracy law supposedly poses in a First
371
Amendment analysis should not be self-defining. Although some scholars
372
have provided excellent defenses of conspiracy law, they have not made
convincing arguments that all conspiracies are so dangerous that their
373
speech should fail the Brandenburg test.
Conspiracy qua conspiracy is not
374
necessarily dangerous.
While this is certainly a normative call for
375
prosecutorial restraint,
it also raises the constitutional issue: if a
prohibition on speech does not address an actual danger, then it is more
likely to violate the First Amendment.

368
369
370
371

372
373

374

375

interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country.”).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
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unprotected. Much of this speech is part of the public discourse on core First
Amendment issues, as in the Al-Hussayen and Mehanna cases. Ipse dixit declarations that
such speech is unprotected may be arbitrary and unresponsive to principles of free
speech. ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 140.
Katyal, supra note 1.
Relatedly, Larry Alexander has expressed doubts that unprotected speech such as
incitement and solicitation can be effectively separated from protected advocacy.
ALEXANDER, supra note 27, at 79.
Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue convincingly that dangerousness,
linked to action, must determine whether blame and punishment are warranted. LARRY
ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME & CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL
LAW 198–99 (2009). They question whether intentions are culpable acts in themselves,
and base the answer on whether the intention alters the world in some way that is
material to criminal law’s concerns, and whether the formation of the intention is itself
intentional. Id. at 200. In his seminal treatise on conspiracy law, Robert Samuel Wright
similarly observed that the criminality of a conspiratorial agreement should depend upon
the potential harm of the intended result. If the agreement is unlikely to result in the
intended substantive crime, then it should not be punished. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at
35–36. Echoing Wright’s analysis, the Dennis Court invoked Learned Hand’s cause-andeffect calculation: “In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quotation marks
omitted). People form conspiracies intentionally, but they can be seen as mere
intentions to do something, often with no real threat of a resulting danger. If this is the
case, then conspiracies should not be punished. The response, of course, is that the
conspiracy itself is the action and the danger that can be punished. Id. at 576–77
(Jackson, J., concurring).
WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 83–84.
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Finally, the All-Purpose Speech Model proposes that conspiracy law
produces the same threats to free speech that the Brandenburg Court did not
countenance. The Court was confronted with “a statute which, by its own
words and as applied, purport[ed] to punish mere advocacy and to forbid,
on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate
376
In light of the All-Purpose Speech Model,
the described type of action.”
conspiracy law punishes the very same advocacy and forbids the very same
assembly. This threatens free speech and may, in fact, violate the First
Amendment.

376

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).

